Hélder Vaz - Um Filho da Guiné-Bissau

Oportunidades de Emprego no Banco Mundial ( Deadline: Nov.- Dez 2007)

2007-11-16T00:19:00.000Z

Professional and Technical Staff Opportunities - Current Vacancies ( Nov.Dec. 2007)



To apply for one of the positions listed below please click on the "Apply" button on the job description. When prompted, sign-in with your existing Member Center account or create a new account on the sign-in page

Job #	Job Title	Job Family	Appointment	Location	Closing Date
071871	Sr Public Health Spec.	Health, Nutrition & Population	International Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071860	Contracts Officer, General Industry	General Services	International Hire	Washington, DC	5-Dec-2007
071858	Contracts Officer, Office Technology	General Services	International Hire	Washington, DC	5-Dec-2007
071857	Sr Financial Management Specialist	Financial Management	International Hire	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	6-Dec-2007
071852	Communications Officer	Communications	International Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071845	Senior Procurement Specialist	Procurement	International Hire	Maputo, Mozambique	30-Nov-2007
071839	Procurement Spec.	Procurement	Local Hire	Freetown, Sierra Leone	7-Dec-2007
071837	Public Sector Specialist	Public Sector Management	International Hire	Kabul, Afghanistan	26-Nov-2007
071828	Urban Specialist	Urban Development	Local Hire	Beijing, China	23-Nov-2007
071823	Sr Economist (Health)	Health, Nutrition & Population	International Hire	Washington, DC	9-Dec-2007
071820	Procurement Spec.	Procurement	Local Hire	Accra, Ghana	23-Nov-2007
071818	Manager, HR Service and Support Center (HRSSC)	Human Resources	International Hire	Washington, DC	28-Nov-2007
071816	Financial Management Specialist	Financial Management	Local Hire	Almaty, Kazakhstan	19-Nov-2007
071814	Sector Director, Sustainable Development	Infrastructure	International Hire	Washington, DC	28-Nov-2007
071812	Sector Manager (Urban and Transport)	Urban Development	International Hire	Washington, DC	25-Nov-2007
071810	HD Economist/Specialist	Other	Local Hire	Sydney, Australia	30-Nov-2007
071808	Sr Program Officer	Information Technology	International Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071807	Program Analyst	Information Technology	Local Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071806	Program Analyst	Information Technology	Local Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071797	Program Manager, Executive Search	Human Resources	International Hire	Washington, DC	26-Nov-2007
071796	Sr Economist (Health)	Health, Nutrition & Population	International Hire	Washington, DC	19-Nov-2007
071794	Procurement Spec.	Procurement	Local Hire	Sana'a, Yemen	26-Nov-2007
071784	Communications Officer/Web Editor	Communications	International Hire	Washington, DC	15-Nov-2007
071775	Lead Economist	Economic Policy	International Hire	Washington, DC	15-Nov-2007
071760	Sr Social Protection Specialist	Social Protection	Local Hire	Islamabad, Pakistan	20-Nov-2007
071748	Senior Economist	Economic Policy	International Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071740	Investment Officer	Treasury	International Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071732	Power Engineer - Uganda	Energy and Mining	Local Hire	Kampala, Uganda	26-Nov-2007
071731	Senior Project Manager	General Services	International Hire	Washington, DC	15-Nov-2007
071729	Senior Economist	Poverty Reduction	International Hire	Washington, DC	15-Nov-2007
071706	Accounting Analyst (Taxation Specialist)	Accounting	International Hire	Washington, DC	4-Dec-2007
071693	Sr Investment Officer	Treasury	International Hire	Washington, DC	30-Nov-2007
071655	Auditor (Country Operations)	Other	Local Hire	Cairo, Egypt	16-Nov-2007
071643	Sr Environmental Spec/Sr Social Development Specialist	Environment	International Hire	Beijing, China	19-Nov-2007
071635	Senior Financial Officer	Treasury	International Hire	Washington, DC	26-Nov-2007
071626	Adviser, Capacity Development	Operational Services	International Hire	Washington, DC	16-Nov-2007
071583	Sr. Economist for the Children and Youth Unit (HDN)	Other	International Hire	Washington, DC	2-Dec-2007
071066	Principal Investment Officer	Investment	International Hire	Washington, DC	20-Nov-2007

Banco Mundial: Programa de Jovens Quadros para Afro-descendentes 2008

2007-11-16T00:12:00.000Z

Junior Professionals Program for Afro-Descendants



We are NO MORE ACCEPTING APPLICATIONS for 2007. The Junior Professionals Program for Afro-Descendants (JPPAD) provides young and motivated individuals with practical, on-the-job experience and training in a global development environment, while giving the Bank an opportunity to benefit from the knowledge, talent and diversity that they can bring to the institution. In addition, the program contributes to capacity-building efforts in the candidates' respective home countries, as some of the graduates choose to return to contribute economic development. What are we looking for Are you eligible What are we offering How to apply What are we looking for? The World Bank seeks talented young individuals who can help contribute to alleviating poverty and to improving people's lives by promoting economic and social progress in developing countries. To enhance its mission to reduce poverty, the Bank is committed to promoting diversity, to hiring the best candidates and fostering an environment that makes the most of their ideas and energies. Are you eligible? Eligibility criteria are: 35 years of age or younger. Afro-descendant i.e. Sub-Saharan African descent Masters degree or equivalent in economics, finance, engineering, public health, environment, engineering, public or private sector management, anthropology, sociology, education, human resources management or other disciplines relevant to development. Proficiency in English and working knowledge of at least one other languages such as French, Arabic, Spanish or Portuguese. Three to five years of relevant work experience. Commitment to development. Demonstrated ability to conduct analytical work; to exercise good judgment; to operate in a team-environment; and to work successfully with diverse clients and staff. Ability and willingness to learn from others. Candidates who previously have had a long-term work relationship with the Bank are not eligible to apply. What are we offering? We offer an opportunity for professional development and global experience through a two-year contract with the Bank. Salaries and benefits are in accordance with the Bank Group policies. The contract is non-renewable; however, candidates may compete for open-ended appointments upon completion of their two-year appointment. How to apply? Interested candidates can apply online. (Please take care to provide required information where indicated). Please note that applications will be kept active in our database for a period of six months. Should you still be interested in the program after six months, you will need to re-apply. Only those identified for an assignment will be contacted to discuss their interest and availability. Candidates are selected by a panel on a highly competitive basis.

Rede Mundial de Formação para o Desenvolvimento

2007-11-16T00:06:00.000Z

Créé par la Banque mondiale en juin 2000, le Réseau mondial de formation pour le développement (GDLN) est un partenariat mondial regroupant plus de 100 centres de formation (affiliés au GDLN) qui permettent aux acteurs du développement du monde entier d’utiliser les nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication.

Grâce aux vidéoconférences, à l’Internet haut débit et aux techniques de formation et de facilitation interactives, les affiliés au GDLN permettent à leurs clients d’organiser des événements de coordination, de consultation et de formation de façon opportune et rentable.

Les clients du GDLN comprennent des instituts universitaires proposant des cours à distance sur les problèmes de développement, des agences de développement cherchant à établir un dialogue avec des partenaires clés à l’étranger, des agences gouvernementales débattant de politique avec leurs homologues d’autres pays et des organisations non gouvernementales qui coordonnent leurs stratégies avec leurs partenaires internationaux.

L’unité principale du réseau, GDLN Services, se trouve dans les locaux du WBI et se compose du secrétariat du GDLN et de l’équipe GDLN Activity Services (Services opérationnels). Les équipes de coordination du GDLN situées dans les bureaux régionaux de la Banque travaillent avec les affiliés et les partenaires dans leurs régions respectives. La Banque fournit l’armature technologique du réseau grâce à son groupe mondial de communication, et en est un client important. Le WBI, à lui seul, a proposé plus de 600 cours, séminaires et débats par l’intermédiaire du GDLN.

Pour plus d’informations, visitez le site http://www.gdln.org

À atenção dos jovens quadros da área do desenvolvimento : Programa de Bolsas do Banco Mundial

2007-11-16T00:01:00.000Z

Institut de la Banque Mondiale (WBI)

Qu'est-ce que les programmes de bourses?

Les programmes de bourses ont pour vocation de promouvoir la diffusion des savoirs et le renforcement des capacités dans les pays en développement. Destinés aux ressortissants de pays membres emprunteurs de la Banque mondiale , ils offrent la possibilité à des professionnels en milieu de carrière de préparer une maîtrise ou un mastère dans des domaines liés au développement. Parallèlement à ses actions de formation, l'Institut de la Banque mondiale administre les deux programmes suivants:

	• Le Programme de bourses Robert S. McNamara, cofinancé par la Banque mondiale et l'Université de Princeton.
	• Le Programme de bourses universitaires Japon/Banque mondiale, financé exclusivement par le Japon.

Vous souhaitez demander une bourse d'études ?

Pour le Programme de bourses universitaires Japon/Banque mondiale, consultez le programme général ou les programmes de partenariat. Pour le Programme McNamara, visitez le site de l'Université de Princeton. Avant de déposer votre demande, n'oubliez pas de prendre connaissance critères d'admissibilité .

Les ressortissants de pays membres qui ne sont pas admis à emprunter et les personnes ne remplissant pas les conditions d'admission doivent rechercher le concours d'autres entités.

Vous souhaitez en savoir plus sur les anciens boursiers ?

Vous pouvez prendre contact avec l'un des coordinateurs régionaux des anciens boursiers et consulter les résultats de l'enquête de suivi réalisée auprès de ceux qui ont suivi l'un de ces programmes.

L'enquête de suivi vise à évaluer le parcours des anciens boursiers qui ont terminé leurs études et également à mettre à jour leurs coordonnées personnelles et professionnelles.

Attention! Aucune bourse ne peut être accordée pour les études de premier cycle, les programmes d'enseignement á distance, les formations de courte durée, les conférences et séminaires, les préparations de thèses, les projets de recherche et les domaines d'étude sans rapport avec le développement. Toute demande de ce type sera écartée.

Ampliar e Manter o Crescimento em África

2007-11-15T23:53:00.000Z

JOANESBURGO, 14 de Novembro de 2007 – Parece que muitas economias africanas deram a volta e que poderão mesmo estar na via de um crescimento mais rápido e seguro, o que é necessário para reduzir os altos níveis de pobreza, de acordo com a publicação “Indicadores do Desenvolvimento da África de 2007” do Banco Mundial (IDA), aqui divulgada hoje.

O desempenho económico sólido na década de 1995-2005 em toda a África contrasta fortemente com o colapso económico de 1975-1985 e com a estagnação que o continente viveu em 1985-95. Os IDA afirmam que se pode continuar a espalhar e manter o crescimento, acelerando a produtividade e aumentando o investimento privado. Para isso será necessário melhorar a conjuntura e a infra-estrutura empresarial nos países africanos, assim como encorajar a inovação e aumentar as capacidades das instituições.

Em 2005 [o último ano para o qual os indicadores (IDA) registam dados], o desempenho variou consideravelmente através dos países, passando de -2,2% no Zimbabué para 30,8% na Guiné Equatorial, e tendo nove países reportado taxas de crescimento próximas ou superiores ao limiar de 7% necessário para uma redução continuada da pobreza.

Os países africanos inserem-se neste contínuo em três amplas categorias. O primeiro grupo de sete países, onde vivem 27,7% da população da região, compreende as sete principais economias exportadoras de petróleo da região. O segundo grupo de 18 países (35,6% da população da região) exibe um crescimento diversificado e sustentado de pelo menos 4%. E o terceiro grupo de 17 países (onde vivem 36,7% da população da região) caracteriza-se pela escassez de recursos, grande instabilidade, predisposição para conflitos, por países que foram afectados ou saíram recentemente de conflitos, ou simplesmente que se encontram apanhados num crescimento lento inferior a 4%.

“Uma maior integração à economia mundial, especialmente através do comércio para exportação, são características comuns a todos os países africanos que registaram um crescimento continuado. Estas características, de acordo com os IDA, explicam em grande medida os níveis agregados de eficiência e os volumes de investimento – comparáveis com os da Índia e do Vietname – registados por esses países ” acrescentou Ezekwesili, indicando que os investimentos na África, em termos globais, tiveram um aumento de 16,8% do PIB para 19,5% do PIB entre 2000 e 2006.

Nesses países, constatam os IDA de 2007, as políticas foram melhores graças às reformas aplicadas na última década, e a inflação, os défices orçamentais, as taxas de câmbio e os reembolsos da dívida são mais comportáveis; as economias são mais abertas ao comércio e às empresas privadas; a governação está a melhorar, tendo havido uma luta mais intensa contra a corrupção . Estes aspectos económicos melhores e fundamentais ajudaram a fomentar o crescimento, mas são igualmente importantes para evitar o colapso do crescimento que teve lugar entre 1975 e 1995.

Os IDA de 2007 advertem que o crescimento da África é mais instável do que em qualquer outra região do mundo. Esta instabilidade, segundo este documento, moderou as expectativas e os investimentos.

“Os IDA de 2007 constataram que evitar o forte declínio do crescimento do PIB era essencial para a recuperação económica da África. Na verdade, era crucial para os pobres que sofreram tanto durante o declínio”, explicou John Page, Economista Principal do Banco Mundial para a Região da África. “Evitar a queda do crescimento é fundamental para progredir mais rapidamente no sentido de a África alcançar os OMD”.

O relatório identifica o crescimento das exportações mais forte e mais diverso como sendo o principal factor necessário para manter o crescimento e reduzir a instabilidade. O estudo lamenta os elevados custos indirectos de exportar na África (entre 18% e 35% dos custos totais), comparado com os custos indirectos na China – meramente 8% dos custos totais. Em consequência, se bem que as empresas africanas eficientes possam competir com as firmas indianas e chinesas em termos de custos de fabricação, elas são menos competitivas devido a custos indirectos de negócios mais elevados, o que inclui as infra-estruturas identificadas nos IDA de 2007 como sendo “um constrangimento emergente para o crescimento futuro”.

A África Subsariana está pelo menos 20 pontos percentuais atrás da média dos países pobres em desenvolvimento que também são financiados no âmbito dos empréstimos concessionais do Banco Mundial (pela AID) em quase todas as medidas de infra-estruturas – fazendo subir os custos de produção, o que é um impedimento maior para os investidores. As necessidades não satisfeitas da África em matéria de infra-estruturas são calculadas num montante total de aproximadamente USD 22 biliões anuais (5% do PIB), mais outros USD 17 biliões para as operações e a manutenção.

Apesar dos efeitos negativos das infra-estruturas deficientes, 38 países africanos aumentaram as suas exportações porque a região, como um todo, viu o valor das suas exportações elevar-se de USD 182 biliões em 2004 para USD 230 biliões em 2005. As exportações foram impulsionadas por grupos crescentes de exportações não tradicionais (tais como o vestuário do Lesoto, de Madagáscar e das ilhas Maurícias); a ligação bem sucedida entre os agricultores e os compradores (tal como no caso da iniciativa que aumentou as exportações de café do Ruanda para os EUA em 166% em 2005); e a ampliação dinâmica das exportações bem sucedidas (tais como as flores frescas, cujas exportações do Quénia mais do que duplicaram entre 2000 e 2005, o que fez com que as flores frescas sejam agora o segundo produto depois do chá a produzir mais ganhos de exportação.

Aproveitando a Base de Dados do Banco Mundial, esta publicação inclui uma edição de bolso, o Pequeno Livro de Dados sobre a África, os Indicadores do Desenvolvimento da África de 2007 – em CD-ROM, e o novo membro da família do IDA, Indicadores do Desenvolvimento da África Online. O Online contem a base de dados mais abrangente sobre a África, abarcando mais de 1.000 indicadores sobre a economia, o desenvolvimento dos recursos humanos, o desenvolvimento do sector privado, a governação, o ambiente e as ajudas, remontando a série de tempo de muitos indicadores a 1965. Estes indicadores foram reunidos a partir de várias fontes para apresentarem uma imagem ampla do desenvolvimento em toda a África. A edição IDA Online oferece o ensaio sobre os IDA, o Pequeno Livro de Dados sobre a África de 2007, quadros, ferramentas de mapas, quadros técnicos e análises dos países no formato de “País Num Relance” (Country at-a-Glance tables).

Répandre et Pérenniser la Croissance en Afrique

2007-11-15T23:48:00.001Z

JOHANNESBURG, le 14 novembre 2007 – De nombreuses économies africaines semblent avoir pris un nouveau virage et s’orientent peut-être vers une croissance économique plus rapide et plus soutenue, condition nécessaire pour réduire les niveaux élevés de pauvreté, selon les Indicateurs 2007 du développement en Afrique de la Banque mondiale (ADI), publiés ici aujourd’hui.

Les solides performances économiques enregistrées dans l’ensemble du continent au cours de la décennie 1995-2005 contrastent nettement avec l’effondrement économique survenu au cours de la décennie 1975-1985 et la stagnation observée en 1985-1995. L’ADI indique qu’il est possible de répandre et pérenniser à l’avenir la croissance en accélérant la productivité et en accroissant l’investissement privé. La réalisation de cet objectif nécessitera l’amélioration du climat des affaires et des infrastructures dans les pays africains, ainsi que la stimulation de l’innovation et le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles.

« Au cours de la dernière décennie, l’Afrique a enregistré un taux de croissance moyen de 5,4 %, une évolution qui suit la tendance observée dans le reste du monde. La possibilité de soutenir, pérenniser et, en fait, de diversifier les sources de ces indicateurs de croissance sera un facteur déterminant, non seulement de la capacité de l’Afrique d’atteindre les ODM, mais aussi de devenir une destination intéressante pour les investissements de capitaux internationaux », a déclaré Obiageli Ezekwesili, le Vice-président de la Banque pour la Région Afrique.

En 2005 [la dernière année pour laquelle l’ADI 2007 fournit des données], la performance a considérablement varié d’un pays à un autre, allant de -2,2 % au Zimbabwe à 30,8 % en Guinée équatoriale, neuf pays affichant des taux de croissance avoisinant ou dépassant le seuil de 7 % nécessaire pour garantir une réduction durable de la pauvreté.

Les pays africains se classent dans trois catégories générales sur ce continuum. Le premier groupe de sept pays comprend les sept principales économies exportatrices de pétrole de la région, qui abritent 27,7 % de la population de la région. Le deuxième groupe de 18 pays (35,6 % de la population de la région) présente une croissance diversifiée et soutenue d’au moins 4 %, et le troisième groupe composé de 17 pays (qui abrite 36,7 % de la population de la région) est caractérisé par le fait qu’ils sont pauvres en ressources naturelles, très instables, exposés aux conflits, déchirés par des conflits ou sortant de situations de conflit ou simplement pris au piège d’une croissance nonchalante située à moins de 4 %.

« Le renforcement de leur intégration dans l’économie mondiale, notamment à travers le commerce d’exportation, constitue la caractéristique commune à tous les pays africains qui ont connu une croissance soutenue. Ceci, selon l’ADI, explique en grande partie les niveaux d’efficacité et les volumes d’investissement — comparable à l’Inde et au Viet Nam — enregistrés par ces pays », a ajouté Ezekwesili, en faisant observer que le montant global des investissements en Afrique est passé de 16,8 % du PIB à 19,5 % du PIB entre 2000 et 2006.

Dans ces pays, constate l’ADI 2007, les politiques se sont améliorées grâce aux réformes de la dernière décennie ; l’inflation, les déficits budgétaires, les taux de change et le remboursement de la dette extérieure sont plus maîtrisables ; les économies sont davantage ouvertes aux échanges et à l’entreprise privée ; des efforts sont entrepris pour garantir une meilleure gouvernance et de nouvelles initiatives sont prises chaque jour pour lutter contre la corruption. Cette amélioration des fondamentaux économiques a permis de stimuler la croissance, mais également d’éviter les effondrements de la croissance auxquelles l’on a assisté entre 1975 et 1995.

L’ADI 2007 prévient que la croissance en Afrique est plus instable que dans toutes les autres régions. Cette instabilité a, dit-il, refroidi les espoirs et découragé les investissements.

« L’ADI 2007conclut que le fait d’éviter les reculs marqués de la croissance du PIB a joué un rôle essentiel dans le redressement économique de l’Afrique. En effet, cela a été déterminant pour les pauvres qui ont été durement affectés par les déclins observés dans le passé », a expliqué John Page, l’économiste en chef de la Banque pour la Région Afrique. « Éviter les chutes brutales de la croissance est indispensable pour accélérer les progrès vers la réalisation des ODM en Afrique ».

Selon ce rapport, le renforcement et la diversification de la croissance des exportations comme un facteur incontournable pour pérenniser la croissance et réduire l’instabilité. L’étude déplore l’augmentation des coûts indirects liés à l’exportation en Afrique (18 % à 35 % du coût total) par rapport aux coûts indirects en Chine, soit 8 % du coût total. Par conséquent, tandis que les entreprises africaines efficaces peuvent soutenir la concurrence avec les entreprises indiennes et chinoises pour ce qui est des coûts de production, elles deviennent moins compétitives à cause des coûts de transaction indirects plus élevés, notamment ceux liés aux infrastructures qui sont identifiées par l’ADI 2007 comme une « nouvelle contrainte pouvant gêner considérablement la croissance à l’avenir ».

Au regard de la quasi-totalité des principaux indicateurs de développement des infrastructures, l’Afrique subsaharienne est en retard d’au moins 20 points par rapport à la moyenne des pays en développement également financés par le guichet de prêt à taux concessionnels de la Banque mondiale (l’IDA), ce qui entraîne ainsi une augmentation des coûts de production, un obstacle considérable à l’investissement. La totalité des besoins non satisfaits de l’Afrique en matière d’infrastructure est estimée à environ 22 milliards de dollars par an (5 % du PIB), auxquels il faut ajouter 17 milliards supplémentaires pour les dépenses de fonctionnement et d’entretien.

Malgré l’incidence négative de l’insuffisance d’infrastructures, 38 pays africains ont accru leurs exportations tandis que l’ensemble de la région a vu augmenter en valeur ses exportations qui sont passées de 182 milliards de dollars en 2004 à 230 milliards de dollars en 2005. Les exportations ont été alimentées par les filières de plus en plus nombreuses d’exportations non traditionnelles (telles que l’habillement au Lesotho, à Madagascar et à Maurice) ; l’établissement d’une relation fructueuse entre les agriculteurs et les acheteurs (grâce, par exemple, à l’initiative qui a accru de 166 % les exportations de café du Rwanda vers les États-Unis en 2005) ; et la forte expansion des produits d’exportation prisés (tels que les fleurs coupées dont les exportations en provenance du Kenya ont plus que doublé entre 2000 et 2005, faisant de ce produit d’exportation la deuxième source de recettes d’exportation du pays, après le thé).

Tirée de la Base de données de la Banque mondiale sur l’Afrique, la publication comprend une édition de poche, le « Little Data Book on Africa », les Indicateurs du développement en Afrique 2007 – CD-ROM, et le nouveau membre de la famille de l’ADI, le site interactif en ligne des Indicateurs du développement en Afrique. Le site en ligne contient la base de données la plus complète sur l’Afrique, couvrant plus de 1 000 indicateurs sur l’économie, le développement humain, le développement du secteur privé, la gouvernance, l’environnement et l’aide ; il est assorti de données chronologiques remontant jusqu’en 1965. Les indicateurs ont été recueillis auprès d’une variété de sources afin de donner une vue large du développement dans l’ensemble de l’Afrique. L’ADI en Ligne permet d’accéder à la publication, au « Little Data Book on Africa » 2007, aux tableaux de données synthétiques sur les pays, ainsi qu’à des cartes, des outils, des encadrés techniques et des analyses par pays.

Boas Notícias : (Africa Achieving Healthy)

2007-11-15T23:32:00.000Z

November 14, 2007 – After years of stop-and-start results, many African economies appear to be growing at the fast and steady rates needed to put a dent in the region’s high poverty rate and attract global investment.

The encouraging trend is shown in the World Bank Africa Development Indicators 2007 (ADI) released today. The report is based on more than a thousand indicators covering economic, human and private-sector development, governance, environment, and aid.

“Over the past decade, Africa has recorded an average growth rate of 5.4 percent which is at par with the rest of the world,” said Obiageli Ezekwesili, World Bank Vice President for the Africa Region . “The ability to support, sustain, and in fact diversify the sources of these growth indicators would be critical not only to Africa’s capacity to meet the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals on poverty, health and other issues], but also to becoming an exciting investment destination for global capital."

‘ Africa Has Learnt to Trade More Effectively’

Summing up some of the most encouraging findings of the report, John Page, Chief Economist for the Africa Region, said:

“Africa has learnt to trade more effectively with the rest of the world, to rely more on the private sector, and to avoid the very serious collapses in economic growth that characterized the 1970s, 1980s and even the early 1990s.”

Page said that what appears to be taking place in Africa since 1995 is “a mastery of the very difficult lessons of the 1980s, an improvement in macro-economic management, in structural policies, an integration with the rest of the world that has allowed African economies to move from having twice as many growth accelerations as growth collapses over the last 30 years.”

While ADI 2007 reported significant long-term gains for Sub-Saharan economies, it warned that the region remains volatile – a condition that has dampened investment. “Avoiding growth collapses is key to accelerating progress toward the MDGs in Africa,” Page said.

A revenue bonanza linked to skyrocketing oil prices has helped Africa’s seven biggest oil economies, which are home to 27.7 percent of the continent’s population. Rising prices of precious metals and other commodities have also benefited many other resource-rich African countries.

Resource-Poor Countries Also Showed Growth Gains

But a group of 18 resource-poor countries – home to 35.6 percent of Africa’s population – have done as well as some oil-rich countries, if not better, sustaining growth of more than 4 percent over the last decade.

Only politically turbulent Zimbabwe among Africa’s 17 slowest-growing economies posted negative growth.

The slowest-growing economies – home to 36.7 percent of the region’s population – are getting more fundamentals right, ADI 2007 found. These include better macro-economic management, greater investments in human resource development, and improvements in institutions and in the performance of the public sector.

Past pessimism about Africa’s ability to grow and compete with the rest of the world “does not arise from the failures of Africa enterprise and workers,” Page said. Rather, it “arises from the fact that the continent faces an infrastructure gap and a level of indirect costs that are anywhere from two to three times as high as those in competing economies in Asia.”

Exporting From Africa Is High Cost Compared to Other Trading Countries

The indirect costs of exporting from Africa (18 to 35 percnt of total costs) are exorbitant compared to exporting from China (8 percent of total costs). Despite these obstacles, African exports expanded by over 11 percentage points on average between 2003 and 2006, according to ADI 2007.

Finding an appropriate balance between investments in human capital and investments in physical capital will help sustain steady progress towards the MDGs and closing Africa’s infrastructure needs, the report said. The infrastructure gap is estimated at $22 billion a year or 5 percent of the region’s GDP.

Besides infrastructure, accelerating and sustaining growth requires improving Africa’s investment climate, spurring innovation, and building institutional capacity to govern well, ADI 2007 said.

Download ADI 2007

Africa Development Indicators 2007:

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTATINAFR/Resources/adi2007_final.pdf

JOVEM CLANDESTINO GUINEENSE , DE 15 ANOS, ATIRADO AO MAR JUNTO Á COSTA BRASILEIRA

2007-11-14T17:07:00.000Z

Africano clandestino é jogado de navio na costa do Espírito

Santo13/11/2007 12:14:51 - Redação Gazeta Rádios e Internet

LETÍCIA GONÇALVESlgoncalves@redegazeta.com.br

Guiné Bissau é um país localizado na costa do Atlântico e também teve colonização portuguesaUm rapaz da Guiné Bissau, país que fica na costa ocidental da África, foi encontrado na baía de Vitória na manhã desta terça-feira (13).

Ele foi socorrido por um pescador e levado para o hospital Antônio Bezerra de Faria, em Vila Velha. Em francês, inglês e até português, o africano tentou explicar como veio parar tão longe de casa.Sem ferimentos graves, mas muito agitado, Mohamed Camara contou aos médicos que saiu da Guiné Bissau escondido em um navio e, assim que descoberto pela tripulação, foi arremessado ao mar.

Ele não teria ficado muitas horas na água e passa bem, de acordo com a diretoria do hospital. O rapaz, de aparência jovem, diz ter 15 anos.

Exames apontam que Mohamed Camara não ficou muito tempo no mar“Ele está bem, mas não consegue parar de falar, conta o que passou no mar, está assustado.

Disse que poderia ter sido atacado por um tubarão”, conta Rosane Caiado, diretora técnica do hospital Antônio Bezerra de Faria. Mohamed agora deve continuar em observação. Enquanto isso, dois agentes da Polícia Federal o acompanham.

TACV Vai Ligar Bissau a Lisboa

2007-10-29T22:49:00.001Z

CORREIO DAS ILHAS

TACV abre as rotas

27-10-07

A TACV - Cabo Verde Airlines está num autêntico frenesim, com abertura de novas rotas. A linha Cabo Verde/Londres é inaugurada no dia 29 de Outubro e uma outra para Varsóvia a 9 de Novembro. No próximo dia 5 de Novembro a companhia cabo-verdiana aterra em Banjul (Gâmbia) e Freetown (Serra Leoa). Já os voos Lisboa - Bissau, via ilha do Sal, terão início neste domingo.

O voo Lisboa - Bissau, ao que conseguimos apurar, é uma proposta disponível a partir deste sábado, 27. A partida de Lisboa será às 12h50 e de Bissau às 13h, horas locais. “Haverá uma paragem de uma hora e quinze minutos no Aeroporto da Praia, para mudança de aparelho para o ATR 72, que assegurará a ligação Sal-Bissau.

Esta nova oferta da TACV permite ainda aos passageiros que vêm de Lisboa permanecer uma semana na ilha do Sal, até o próximo voo para Bissau, ou três dias, na Praia para os que saem de Bissau”, revela uma fonte da empresa, que lembra que a companhia já assegura voos para a capital guineense, com escala em Dacar.

De acordo com essas mesmas informações recolhidas na empresa, nesta fase, as ligações para Bissau não são viagens turísticas, embora fique em aberto a possibilidade de o viajante poder ficar na ilha do Sal. Também se optar pode seguir viagem no mesmo dia para Bissau, sem problemas. “Esta é, acima de tudo, uma alternativa entre Lisboa e Bissau”, indica a fonte que vimos citando.

Um dia depois, mais precisamente no dia 29, de acordo com António Socorro, do departamento de Marketing, a TACV inaugurará a linha Cabo Verde/Londres. Segue-se a ligação para Varsóvia, no dia 9 de Novembro. De Londres haverá voos para a Praia, às segundas, e para o Sal, às quintas, ambos os voos prosseguindo para Fortaleza.

A situação se repete também com os voos provenientes de Varsóvia, que terão Fortaleza como destino final, mas apenas com os voos da ilha do Sal, às sextas-feiras. Em ambos os casos os voos são garantidos por um dos aparelhos Boeing 757 da companhia.

O objectivo, explica António Socorro, é fazer um hub na ilha do Sal para trazer tráfico - passageiros e cargas da Europa e conectando-a com o Brasil. O mesmo acontecerá em relação às linhas Bissau e Dacar. Entretanto, já chegou a Cabo Verde o ATR-42-500, o terceiro, para reforçar os voos regionais e inter-ilhas. Constança de Pina

This is Guinea-Bissau (?)

2007-10-26T13:29:00.001Z

Nene Tuty Bssafinté Mantchuta- Aleluia

2007-10-26T13:27:00.001Z

Chachá di Charmi - Aló Guiné - Dur Di Nha Dur

2007-10-26T13:25:00.001Z

n`punta bu nome

2007-10-26T13:24:00.003Z

Camilo Domingos: dolce vita

2007-10-26T13:24:00.001Z

Camilo Domingos: nha vida chora

2007-10-26T13:23:00.001Z

Ballet Nafaya, de Matam , Guinée -Conakry

2007-10-26T13:21:00.001Z

Guiné-Bissau - Americo Gomes: About you

2007-10-26T13:19:00.001Z

Américo Gomes

2007-10-26T13:08:00.001Z

Insólito

2007-10-26T13:07:00.001Z

Hommage a la Guinée

2007-10-26T13:05:00.001Z

LA GUINEE: CHANGEMENT !

2007-10-26T13:04:00.001Z

Lettre ouverte / Insoumis Sigui

2007-10-26T13:03:00.001Z

massacre du 22 janvier 2007 en Guinée

2007-10-26T13:02:00.001Z

Massacre en Guinée Conakry 2007 - (1er Partie)

2007-10-26T13:01:00.001Z

Guinée - Conakry 2006/2007

2007-10-26T12:59:00.001Z

Sekouba Bambino, Desert Festival, Essakane, Tombouctou 2006

2007-10-26T12:58:00.001Z

SEKOUBA BAMBINO DIABATÉ a Montreal

2007-10-26T12:57:00.001Z

Sekouba Bambino - Jolie Den

2007-10-26T12:56:00.001Z

Arrivée de Sekouba Bambino a Berlin

2007-10-26T12:55:00.001Z

Sekouba Bambino a Kankan Mamaya -2007

2007-10-26T12:53:00.001Z

SEKOUBA BAMBINO DIABATÉ: LIVE CONCERT A KANKAN

2007-10-26T12:52:00.003Z

GUINEE : JAMAIS OUBLIER JANVIER 2007

2007-10-26T12:52:00.001Z

Yaya Bangoura

2007-10-26T12:51:00.001Z

Maimouna Barry

2007-10-26T12:50:00.001Z

Djekoria Fanta

2007-10-26T12:49:00.001Z

Sona Tata

2007-10-26T12:48:00.001Z

Sona_Tata

2007-10-26T12:47:00.001Z

Histoire de La Guinée (1er Partie)

2007-10-26T12:46:00.003Z

Histoire de La Guinée ( 2e partie)

2007-10-26T12:46:00.001Z

Guinée - Calu Bana : Fernandinha

2007-10-26T12:40:00.001Z

Guine - Bissau, Amerigo Gomes: Madon(Mbalakh Ndiago)

2007-10-26T12:39:00.001Z

Guiné-Bissau : Amerigo Gomes: Inha nomi

2007-10-26T12:37:00.001Z

Guine -Bissau, Amerigo Gomes: Madon(Mbalakh Ndiago)

2007-10-26T12:35:00.001Z

Guiné - Bissau: Amerigo Gomes: Arcel

2007-10-26T12:34:00.001Z

Guinée - Amerigo Gomes: Tempo nobo

2007-10-26T12:31:00.001Z

N`punta bu nome

2007-10-26T12:28:00.001Z

Guineendady

2007-10-26T12:27:00.001Z

Guiné Bissau e o Malamjae 2

2007-10-26T12:25:00.001Z

Guiné-Bissau, Bissau Capital di Sabura KU Cansera

2007-10-26T12:22:00.001Z

Guiné Bissau, saudades e mais saudades

2007-10-26T12:21:00.001Z

Guiné Bissau paisagens di terra bonito

2007-10-26T12:20:00.003Z

A PROPÓSITO DOS VOSSOS COMENTÁRIOS QUE NÃO CHEGAM AO BLOG:

2007-10-07T00:27:00.000Z

ESTE BOLG É MEU , É TEU, É NOSSO

Finalmente recebi mais um comentário. Acho que é apenas o segundo, desde que criamos o nosso bog. Até agora eu só tenho recebido e-mails falando das postagens, por isso estou feliz por este comentário.

A minha felicidade tem a ver com o facto de eu pretender que este seja um blog partilhado, no qual toda a gente comenta e opina. Como eu disse no início deste blog, as postagens que eu coloco destinam-se apenas a ser um ponto de partida para discussões sobre as temáticas de eleição deste blog; desenvolvimento, ODM, Anti-corrupção, governança, etc,

Por isso me caiu tão bem este comentário. Não tem a ver directamente com as temáticas que se pretende discutir, (redução da pobreza , desenvolvimento, etc ) , mas poderá até ter muito a ver. Este comentário concentra-se na questão da língua e da não publicação de artigos em português. Eis o comentário e eis também a minha modesta resposta. Temos finalmente, por onde começar os nossos “ djumbais”. O meu agradecimento ao “anónimo” que quis perder algum do seu tempo lendo este nosso blog.

O COMENTÁRIO :

Anônimo deixou um novo comentário sobre a sua postagem "Guinée-Bissau : Narco-Etat... le risque est réel !...":

for Helder Vaz

the wonderful citizens of your country may also be interested in particular articles in portuguese. Related to your english posting on corruption, see for instance this one: http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=577074&div_id=291

evidently the article on the '10 myths on governance and corruption' which you have posted in english is being widely read in various languages -- even in the IMF F&D website itself from where you obtained the english article, among other languages, one can now find it in spanish, french, and russian, and apparently it has been translated to arabic as well. On this, among others, one article on it in portuguese is at: http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=577074&div_id=291

A RESPOSTA / Dialogando:

You are right my dear friend. But I’ am here positively, only to share and no more. Definitely no more. As I use to receive the alert notifications daily in English and French, by e-mail, I use to post them at our blog as they are, without comments , just to provide information and to help and guide less informed colleagues to find the resources for their work. As you know , in Guinea-Bissau the internet services are very poor and don’t allow them to access so easily as abroad.

Anyway , my colleagues I am trying to provide some information here, are much more fluent in English and French then me. Unfortunately most of the “ wonderful citizens of my country “ have no access to the internet services, energy, water and sanitation, etc. The reality is that even if they might or “may also be interested in particular articles in Portuguese”, it will not be easy for them to read my blog. Thus my target is different and smaller and my purposes are to help some professionals in Guinea-Bissau working on development issues. And, of course I do this for pleasure and to relax at the week-end.

The article in Portuguese, you kindly sent to me ( http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=577074&div_id=291 ) had already been posted at our blog (at 19:07), even before your comment (22:23) . Unfortunately the Portuguese translation of the article is not as complete as the English version. As you can see, today I decided to post some articles in Portuguese from Brazil. But it isn’t easy (for me) to find good and complete articles in Portuguese. I am a lover of the Portuguese language, but I have no time to translate all the articles I read every single day, from all the sources.

At last but not least, please, take a look at the Portuguese translation of the Myth #2, at the article you mentioned:

Daniel Kaufmann :

“Myth #2: Governance and corruption cannot be measured. It is true that less than a dozen years ago virtually no internationally comparable measures of governance or corruption existed. But in recent years, the World Bank and others have sought to remedy this. At the World Bank, we have constructed aggregate governance indicators that cover more than 200 countries, based on more than 350 variables obtained from dozens of institutions worldwide. Our indicators cover the following six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of major violence and terror; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption.

While the indicators represent a big step forward, there are measurement challenges. Margins of error are not trivial, and caution in interpreting the results is warranted—one should not precisely rank countries. But these margins of error have declined, and are now substantially lower than for any individual measure of corruption, governance, or the investment climate. As a result, the World Bank’s governance indicators are used worldwide for monitoring performance, for country assessments, and for research.”

Portugal Diário :

http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=577074&div_id=291

“Segundo Kaufman, governação e corrupção não podem ser mensurados. Mas o Banco Mundial reuniu em base de dados indicadores de governação de mais de 200 países, constituidos por mais de 350 variáveis obtidos por dezenas de instituições por todo o mundo.”

ANY COMMENTS …?

Anyway I appreciate your kind and useful comment, and I must thank you for your interest and very wise and important guidance. ESTAMOS JUNTOS!

E AGORA DESCULPEM , MAS HOJE VOU DORMIR CEDO PORQUE, AFINAL, EU TAMBÉM SOU FILHO DE DEUS.

Um domingo feliz para todos e para cada um de vós.

ZHONGXIANG ZHANG : China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective

2007-10-06T19:13:00.000Z

China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective
ZHONGXIANG ZHANG East-West Center - Research Program September 2006

Abstract: China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns have sparked China's interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in China's view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. In this context, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. However, China's oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western capitals. Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing's ties to the so-called rogue states undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or punishing these states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect human rights. This paper argues that China's hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. That said, the paper suggests that, in pursuing its oil diplomacy, Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the international community. The paper points out that devoting more resources to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. This way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and helps to enhance China's security of energy supply and at the same time would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. Overall, it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China.
China’s Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective ZhongXiang Zhang, Ph.D in Economics Senior Fellow East-West Center 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, HI 96848-1601, USA Tel: +1-808-944 7265 Fax: +1-808-944 7298 Email: ZhangZ@EastWestCenter.org In the last couple years, the Chinese government has been making serious overtures to African countries in order to obtain contracts for fuel supply. There have been numerous media reports on this issue. But in my view, China’s hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. To put this issue into perspective, let me first put China’s overall energy demand and supply in context because these factors are often overlooked in discussing the issue. China is indeed a large energy consumer. In the mean time, China has also become a large producer. Currently, domestic supply provides about 94% of the total energy consumption in China, meaning that the overall energy dependence (namely, the ratio of the energy that a country imports to the total it consumes) is about 6%. In the future, China will continue to rely mainly on domestic supply to meet its growing energy demand. With a variety of policies and investments that have been made and continue to be made to further expand domestic supply capacity, domestic, conventional energy is estimated to supply 2400 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). During the current five-year period running from 2006 to 2010, the Chinese government has set a goal of cutting energy use per unit of its gross domestic product by 20%. The government has also established medium to long term energy conservation plan to keep the country’s total energy demand below 3000 million tce in 2020 (NDRC, 2004). This suggests that domestic supply will meet 80% of the total energy consumption. Even if energy demand goes up to 3600 million tce in the worst case scenario as some analysts suggest, China’s domestic supply is still able to provide two-thirds of the total energy demand in 2020. This makes China different from other larger energy-using countries like Japan that imports over 80% of its total energy consumption. That said, this by no means questions the increased importance of China’s growing oil imports. China was traditionally self-sufficient in oil, but since 1993 has been a net oil importer. China’s economic boom and stagnated supply of domestic oil have produced the growing hunger for foreign oil. As of 2003, China emerged second only behind the U.S. in terms of oil imports. At present, China imports over 40% of its oil consumption and this is expected to rise to 60% or more by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). Energy security has risen to the height of importance in its foreign policy, and is becoming what has been called a “transforming” factor in the relations between China and the Middle East, Russia, and energy-rich Central Asian, African and Latin American countries (Yi, 2005). China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns have sparked China’s interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in China’s view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. Given their closeness and accessibility through pipelines, China has been keen to invest in Central Asian and Russian oil field development projects and in the construction of pipelines in order to bring oil from these regions. In the meantime, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. In the meantime, China’s oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western capitals (Eisenman and Stewart, 2005). Critics accused China of fueling conflicts and human-rights violations in Africa by selling arms to some repressive regimes in exchange for oil and minerals (Bezlova, 2006). Beijing has been building goodwill by strengthening bilateral trade agreements, awarding aid and forgiving national debt. For example, China voluntarily waived US$ 1.2 billion in sovereign African debt in 2000 when the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was formed to promote trade and investment with 44 African countries (Kitissou, 2005). To date, Beijing has given more than US$ 5.5 billion in assistance and canceled the debt of 31 African countries (Masaki, 2006). Beijing has helped to build the railroad network in Nigeria, main roads in Rwanda, as well as bridges, stadiums and harbours. In accompanying this, China has forged closer economic relations with Africa. Bilateral trade between China and Africa hit a record of US$ 40 billion in 2005, up 35% from 2004. Given that African-Japanese trade totaled US$ 18 billion in 2005, China is outdoing Japan, the world’s second largest economy (Masaki, 2006). In recent years, the top Chinese leaders frequently paid the visits to oil-producing countries. This goodwill-based energy diplomacy has helped China to make remarkable inroads in striking energy deals with oil-rich African countries in the Gulf of Guinea, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Niger, and Sudan. The Chinese oil companies’ overseas investments not only mitigate China’s own concern about oil security by obtaining equity oil overseas. For example, Sudan is China’s largest overseas oil production base, and more than half of the country’s oil exports go to China, which accounts for about 5% of China’s total oil imports. Now, Angola has become China’s second largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia, and Africa as a whole provides over a quarter of the Chinese oil imports (British Petroleum, 2006; Xinhua News Agency, 2006). The Chinese oil companies’ investments also help these African developing countries to raise their standards of living. For example, China’s assistance has helped to turn Sudan into an oil-exporting country. Moreover, Chinese investments in oil fields in African countries help to pump more oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil on the world market. The new addition to the markets may help to prevent oil prices rising even higher. Certainly, other Asian countries could follow suit. In my view, this will not affect the relationship between Chinese companies and their African counterparts, given China’s long-established friendship with African countries and the championing of their interests, not to mention mutually, commercially benefits. But this will affect the price of China’s oil acquisitions. China has already competed with Japan for oil and gas fields in Russia and Central Asia. At present, there is no direct competition between China and Japan for African oil resources, largely because Japan has almost ignored Africa as a source of its badly needed oil. This may change in the future, because Japan has stepped up its Africa diplomacy in recent years. While China aggressively pursuing oil and gas interests in Africa plays a part, this has been mainly promoted by a strong desire for Japan to gain support from the continent’s 53 countries for its bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat (Masaki, 2006). While cooperating with each other occasionally (In the first instance of Sino-Indian cooperation, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) won a joint bid in December 2004 to buy PetroCanada’s 37% stake in Syrian oilfields for US$ 573 million. India and China also work together in Sudan, where CNPC operates the Greater Nile oilfield, in which ONGC has a 25% stake (Aiyar, 2006).), China and India already compete for energy resources in Africa as well as in other regions. The Chinese oil companies have a history of overpaying for equity positions (Balfour, 2002). Because China has viewed paying a higher price than competitors to secure energy resources to be more of a national security issue than the absolute price itself (Bradsher, 2005), such bidding wars between Chinese companies and Indian rivalries have further intensified the tendency of Chinese oil companies paying far above what other competitors offer. To date, India has been losing out in every deal that both China and India have been shooting for. But China has grabbed these deals by overbidding at least 10% more than its competitor India has bided. In January 2006, the China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) bought a 45% stake in the Akpo offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria for US$ 2.27 billion by outbidding the competitor, ONGC that submitted a bid of US$ 2 billion but withdrew after India’s cabinet raised concerns about the risks involved (Aiyar, 2006; Masaki, 2006). In August 2005, CNPC paid US$4.18 billion to acquire Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan, making it China’s largest foreign acquisition ever (Bradsher, 2005). Originally, CNPC offered US$ 3.6 billion. With the Indian consortium’s (ONGC-Mittal) bid of US$ 3.8 billion, CNPC hiked its offer to US$4.18 billion to grab this deal (Basu, 2005). However, it is important to note that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy. CNOOC failed to acquire Unocal for US$ 18.5 billion, although it topped Chevron’s bid of US$ 16.4 billion. But, in the end, Chevron grabbed the deal. It should be pointed out that China’s oil diplomacy has its own price. Critics have increasingly labeled China’s relations with oil-producing countries as the oil ties. In their views, China’s growing ties with Africa are purely for oil, and as long as it helps the country to secure oil deals, China is willing to exchange political, financial and military favors without regard to transparency, development and stability in Africa. To put it simply, critics accused China of mixing business with politics in pursuit of its economic gains in Africa. However, it is important to note that while China appears quite willing to get oil from wherever it can, this does not mean that China would not invest elsewhere, say, in less “roguish” nations, if it had the option. Under economic rationale, no country would prefer to invest in an unstable regime over investment in a more stable one. However, China’s options are limited. Partly because the Western powers have gained control over best oil fields available, as a late entrant to the international oil game, China has little choice but to strike deals with the so-called rogue states, which are identified by the U.S., to secure oil supplies. Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing’s ties to these countries undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or punishing rogue states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect human rights (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Wu and Shen, 2006). Although it is unlikely to bring the two countries in direct confrontation, China’s practice of oil diplomacy is widely perceived in Washington as attempts to threaten U.S. security interests because Beijing strikes deals either with rogue states that Washington has tried to marginalize or in America’s backyard which Washington perceives as its turf and within its traditional sphere of influence (The U.S. has long regarded Central and South America as part of its backyard, and Canada as an extension of its front porch. Washington perceives that recent forays by Beijing into the Western Hemisphere, which are part of Beijing’s global search for large supplies of oil-based energy, are challenging its influence. Beijing’s search has recently taken to Venezuela and Canada, which together provide about 25% of U.S. oil imports. The anti-American President of Venezuela has spoken of a desire to reduce its dependence on the U.S. market (Richardson, 2005). Beijing and Ottawa have concluded a series of energy and resources agreements, providing for greater Chinese involvement in developing Canada’s natural gas sector, its vast oil sands deposits and its uranium sector. This could create tensions between Beijing and Washington as well as between Washington and Ottawa, because U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2001 national energy policy report emphasizes the importance of Canada’s tar sands to U.S. energy security (Zweig and Bi, 2005).). Thus, China should be very cautious in pursuing this type of oil diplomacy. Let me make this point clear. I am not suggesting that Beijing stance should be swayed by Washington. What I am suggesting is that Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the international community. Beijing aggressively pursuing this type of oil diplomacy without proper consideration of the international community’s concern may benefit China in the short-term, but may hurt it in the longer term, reducing its future benefits. China has achieved its own rise and close to being integrated into the global economy and norms. Given that China will not possess large scale oceangoing naval capabilities in the near future, it must depend on the global economy and norms. Thus, it is in China’s own long-term interest to support the stability of the international regimes. For the time being, Beijing should think deeply about how to be more nuanced in responding to the concerns and perceptions of Washington and Brussels instead of just repeating nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states as its guiding principle of foreign policy. Perhaps devoting more resources to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. In my view, this way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. In the meantime, it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This viewpoint has been motivated by an interview with Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations, Harvard University. It has benefited from useful comments from Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen. That said, the views expressed here are those of the author. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and omissions that may remain. REFERENCES Aiyar, P. (2006), No ‘Great Game’ between India and China, Asia Times, January 13, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HA13Cb01.html. Balfour, F. (2002), A Global Shopping Spree for the Chinese: Mainland Companies Are Snapping Up More Overseas Assets, Business Week, 18 November, Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_46/b3808162.htm. Basu, I. (2005), India Discreet, China Bold in Oil Hunt, Asia Times, September 29, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI29Df01.html. Bezlova, A. (2006), China’s Soft-Power Diplomacy in Africa, Asia Times, June 23, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF23Ad01.html. Bradsher, K. (2005), Chinese Company to Buy Kazakh Oil Interests for $4 Billion, The New York Times, August 22. British Petroleum (2006), Statistical Review of World Energy, London. Eisenman, J. and D. Stewart (2005), China-Japan Oil Rivalry Spills into Africa, Asia Times, November 17, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GK17Ad01.html. Kitissou, M. (2005), China and Africa: A Case in ‘Petro Politics’, Center for Global Studies Bulletin, George Mason University, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 9-10. Masaki, H. (2006), Japan Takes on China in Africa, Asia Times, August 15, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HH15Dh01.html. NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission, 2004), China Medium and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan, Beijing, November. Pala, C. (2006), China Pays Dearly for Kazakhstan Oil, The New York Times, March 17. Richardson, M. (2005), Oil-Seeking China Steps on U.S. Toes, New Zealand Herald, February 14, Available at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c_id=2&ObjectID=10010884. Wu, L. and Q. Shen (2006), Will China Go to War over Oil?, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 169, No. 3, pp. 38-40. Xinhua News Agency (2006), China OGP, Beijing. Yi, X. (2005), Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Understanding China’s ‘Peaceful Development’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 74-112. Zhang, Z.X. (2005), Sustainable Energy Development in China: Challenges Ahead to 2020, The Keynote Address at the International Conference on “Staying Ahead of the Energy Scenarios”, Bangkok, Thailand, November 11. Zweig, D. and J. Bi (2005), China’s Global Hunt for Energy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 25-38.	Keywords: China, Oil hunt in Africa, Energy polcy

IFC: Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference

2007-10-06T19:05:00.000Z

Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference

Starting a business is not easy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It takes 13 procedures and 155 days—and it costs five times the annual income per capita. The situation is even worse for women: they need the consent of a husband. And if you are a single woman, a judge decides whether you can become a businesswoman.

The result: Only 18 percent of small businesses are run by women in the DRC. Next door, in Rwanda, which has no such regulations, women run more than 41 percent of small businesses.

But many countries are making it easier to do business. The Doing Business 2008 report identifies 200 reforms in 98 countries between April 2006 and June 2007.

The top reformer was Egypt. Unhappy with its Doing Business ranking last year, the Egyptian government pulled out all stops. Its efforts cut deep—with reforms in five of the 10 areas studied by the report. It made the single fastest climb in the overall rankings on the ease of doing business.

Georgia, the top reformer last year, remains in the top 10 and continues to target better rankings each year. Its efforts are paying off: Georgia is now in the top 25 countries in overall rankings for the ease of doing business. Two African countries—Ghana and Kenya—also made this year's list of the top 10 reformers.

"Overall, Doing Business has had a powerful catalytic effect," says Simeon Djankov, the lead author of the report. "For example, in the past two years, we have recorded 413 reforms in the countries we study. We have been able to confirm at least 113 instances where Doing Business inspired or informed business regulatory reforms worldwide."

The Financial Times has noted that in publishing Doing Business, the World Bank Group is "producing a public good: measurements of regulatory performance that may become as indispensable to reformers and academics as national income accounts."

Business startup and investor returns

Doing Business 2008 finds that large emerging markets are reforming fast, with the potential to benefit hundreds of millions of people. Egypt, China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam all improved in the ease of doing business.

Doing Business is also analyzing the benefits of reform. "The report shows equity returns are highest in countries that are reforming the most," said Michael Klein, World Bank/IFC Vice President for Financial and Private Sector Development. "Investors are looking for upside potential, and they find it in economies that are reforming—regardless of their starting point," he added.

By far the fastest reforms are in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which, as a region, surpassed East Asia this year in the ease of doing business. Estonia, the most business-friendly country of the former socialist bloc, ranks 17th on the ease of doing business. "The results show that as governments ease regulations for doing business, more entrepreneurs go into business," said Djankov. "Eastern Europe has witnessed a boom in new business entry, and many of the new companies are becoming global leaders, such as the Estonian-born software company Skype and the Czech car maker Skoda," he added.

Reforming business regulations benefits women
Doing Business is about studying obstacles to equal opportunity, and this year it began to look at this issue as it affects women. Initial findings indicate that higher rankings on the ease of doing business are associated with higher percentages of women among entrepreneurs and employees. Greater regulatory reform has especially large benefits for women, who often face regulations that may be aimed at protecting them but are counterproductive in effect, forcing them into the informal sector. There women have little job security and few social benefits.

The Doing Business project has committed to a two-year research program on reforms that improve the job and business opportunities for women.

Hitting the road
Doing Business does a simple but powerful thing: it systematically and objectively measures the time and cost involved in setting up, running, and closing a business in 178 countries around the world. With the publishing of the new report, the Doing Business team kicks off its annual road show visiting dozens of countries—and may be coming to a place near you.

Visit the Web site for more information on the project, to order copies of Doing Business 2008, and to generate your own reports using the latest Doing Business data: www.doingbusiness.org.

About Doing Business
A high ranking on the ease of doing business means that a government has created a regulatory environment conducive to operating a business, yet the rankings do not tell the whole story. They do not account for other factors such as the quality of infrastructure services, macroeconomic policy, proximity to large markets, or law and order.

A joint IFC-World Bank product, Doing Business is based on the efforts of more than 5,000 local experts around the world—business consultants, lawyers, accountants, government officials, and leading academics—who provide empirical input and methodological support and review.

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Let's have a deeper discussion on aid

2007-10-06T18:19:00.001Z

About this Talk

After four days of intense discussion on aid versus trade at TEDGlobal 2007, it was up to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Finance Minister of Nigeria, to sum it up. She asks, first, for the discussion to continue, and for it to grow more sophisticated, more nuanced. And she shares a gripping story that puts the aid-versus-trade debate into true human terms.

Speakers Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Economic reformer

As the first female Finance Minister in Nigeria, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala attacked corruption to make the country more desirable for foreign investment and job creation.

Why you should listen to her:

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, was Nigeria's Finance Minister and then briefly Foreign Affairs Minister from 2003 to 2006, the first woman to hold either position.

During her tenure, she worked to combat corruption, make Nigeria's finances more transparent, and institute reforms to make the nation's economy more hospitable to foreign investment. The government unlinked its budget from the price of oil, its main export, to lessen perennial cashflow crises, and got oil companies to publish how much they pay the government.

Since 2003 -- when watchdog group Transparency International rated Nigeria "the most corrupt place on Earth" -- the nation has made headway recovering stolen assets and jailing hundreds of people engaged in international Internet 419 scams.

Okonjo-Iweala is a former World Bank vice president who graduated from Harvard and earned a Ph.D. in regional economics and development at MIT. Her son Uzodinma Iweala is the celebrated young author of Beasts of No Nation.

"Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a heroine not just of Nigeria, but of the entire continent. Her crusade against corruption has put her life at risk."

The Independent (UK)

Menos corrupção colocaria Portugal ao nível da Finlândia

2007-10-06T18:04:00.000Z

Dinheiro (Arquivo)

Menos corrupção colocaria Portugal ao nível da Finlândia

Estudo do Banco Mundial mostra que países podem triplicar rendimento per capita. E diminuir mortalidade infantil. Corrupção prejudica famílias mais pobres com impostos injustos e cria a necessidade de «subornos» nos serviços públicos

MAIS:

«Dez mitos sobre a governação e corrupção» aponta o caminho para o desenvolvimento. E garante que a diminuição da corrupção poderia pôr Portugal na senda do desenvolvimento, ao mesmo nível da Finlândia.

Daniel Kaufmann, director dos Programas Globais do Instituto do Banco Mundial, apresenta esta tese num artigo publicado na revista trimestral do Fundo Monetário Internacional, «Finance and Development», também divulgada na internet.

O estudo do Banco Mundial estima que um país que melhore a sua governação e que parta de um baixo nível pode alcançar uma bom termo de desenvolvimento e triplicar o rendimento per capita da população. As melhorias, segundo Kaufman, vão mais longe e afectam ainda a redução da mortalidade infantil assim como a iliteracia.

Essa melhoria corresponderia a subida no nosso ranking em questões de «controlo e corrupção» na base de dados do Banco de Portugal, subindo Portugal ao nível da Filândia, Guiné Equatorial ao nível do Uganda que, por sua vez, alcançaria a Lituânia que, chegaria ao rendimento de Portugal.

O texto, intitulado «Dez mitos sobre governação e corrupção», aborda várias questões, nomeadamente o impacto da governação no desenvolvimento. No estudo, o responsável do Banco Mundial mostra que em geral os países podem extrair enormes dividendos do desenvolvimento e da melhoria da governação.

Segundo Kaufman, governação e corrupção não podem ser mensurados. Mas o Banco Mundial reuniu em base de dados indicadores de governação de mais de 200 países, constituidos por mais de 350 variáveis obtidos por dezenas de instituições por todo o mundo.

No caso de corrupção, em países em desenvolvimento, a corrupção acaba por resultar numa desproporção para as famílias com menores rendimentos: pagam mais impostos do que deveriam, e parte dos seus rendimentos são gastos em «subornos» para terem acesso aos serviços públicos. Numa estimativa, as transações mundiais são «manchadas» pela corrupção em perto de um trilião de dólares.

Sociedade :TATIANA de Luanda, Finalista do 2º Big Brother Africa

2007-10-06T17:45:00.000Z

October , 2007

TAKE 2 ON FRIDAY! BIG BROTHER AFRICA 2 AND THE FINALISTS ARE!

Posted by coolgal http://www.mnetafrica.com/bigbrother/task.asp

Okay here we go, Big brother africa 2 finalists are listed below. I will start with the heartbreaker Richard below.

Name: Richard Age: 24 Birthday: August 10 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Ilala Height: 1.77m Occupation: Student

If he won USD 100 000, Tanzanian housemate Richard says he’d spend it buying film equipment. The 24-year-old film student is passionate about making movies and considers filmmaker Peter Jackson as his personal inspiration. The only married contestant on Big Brother Africa 2, Richard would love to visit his wife’s hometown of Brandon in Manitoba, Canada to see “where and how she grew up”.

Name: Tatiana Age: 26 Birthday: March 31 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Luanda Height: 1.76m Occupation: Actress/model

Tatiana is a model and actress by profession. She has won two best actress awards in her own country, which is fantastic for a career that she loves and is good at. It’s no wonder then that she would love to visit Hollywood and meet actress Uma Thurman. A fan of Brazilian soapies, Tatiana relaxes by going to the beach and says audiences should watch her on Big Brother Africa 2 because she’s fun and entertaining though she admits that she has some bad habits. These include the fact that she believes she’s never wrong and she sleeps too much!

Name: Bertha Age: 28 Birthday: June 2 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Harare Height: 1.65m Occupation: Lawyer/PR and Communication Consultant

Bertha spent a year in the USA as an exchange student when she was 16 and says the experience taught her to appreciate and love her home country. “I was an ambassador, a student, and a teacher. I had to learn about my people and teach others about my heritage. That changed my view of Zimbabwe and of Africa….then began my love affair with my continent.”

Name: Code Age: 31 Birthday: June 2 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Blantyre Height: 1.74m Occupation: Broadcaster

Malawian radio personality and music man Code would love to visit Paris, likes weight lifting sometimes, enjoys reading music magazines, loves nature and wants to meet Al Gore because of Gore’s role in the Global Warming Campaign. He says that the best advice he ever got was from his father who told him to “brush your teeth and keep your breath fresh all the time.”

Name: Kwaku Age: 30 Birthday: June 1 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Kumawu Height: 1.77m Occupation: Self Employed (Entertainment Consultant, Brand Architect, Artist)

Ghana’s Kwaku says that it’s in the interest of DStv audiences to watch him on Big Brother Africa 2 because he’ll “keep them entertained.” He also says that he wanted to be on Big Brother Africa 2 because he felt he “had the winning qualities required.” A fan of Ghana’s Black Stars and self motivating literature, he says that if he could spend one day with someone famous, he’d pick Jay Z for a few simple reasons. “I admire his creativity and believe we are like-minded individuals

Name: Maureen Age: 27 Birthday: September 5 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Entebbe Height: 1.65m Occupation: Fashion Designer

Describing herself as playful, naughty and silly sometimes, Maureen says that going to India to study changed her life. She says that graduating from college in India was her best achievement because “the culture is so different from mine.”

Name: OfunnekaAge: 29 Birthday: August 9 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Jos, Plateau Height: 1.6m Occupation: Personal Assistant to Medical Director

Nigerian Big Brother Africa 2 housemate Ofunnekama is a 29-year-old Lagos resident who holds a BSC degree in Chemistry. The straight talking Ofunnekama says that the event that changed her life was the recent end of a relationship which she describes as “an eye opening experience

This show happens to be one of Naijaga's favorites and her mum too. For folks in the US, you can view hilarious clips from the show here. So who is your favorite? Alright sleep time http://naijagal.blogspot.com/2007/10/take-2-on-friday-big-brother-africa-2.html

Mining : Tokyo Sexwale Investing in Cameroon

2007-10-06T17:34:00.001Z

Mvelaphanda Holdings to assess mining and energy in Cameroon

Mvelaphanda Holdings will send a team to Cameroon today to assess mining and energy opportunities in the country.

Bloomberg,

21 Set 2007

Mvelaphanda Holdings, controlled by former South African politician Tokyo Sexwale, will send a team to Cameroon today (subs:Friday) to assess mining and energy opportunities in the country. The company will focus on seeking opportunities in natural gas, gold and iron ore, Sexwale told reporters in Yaounde, Cameroon's capital, on Wednesday, after meeting Cameroonian Prime Minister Ephraim Nyoni.

"We are interested in investing in this country," he said.

Thabo Mbeki and Tokyo Sexwale: Have the two men really settled their past differences?

2007-10-06T17:26:00.000Z

Thabo Mbeki and Tokyo Sexwale

Have the two men really settled their past differences?

James Myburgh

23 Mai 2007

Tokyo Sexwale has been presented as a ‘compromise candidate' for the presidency of the African National Congress. The claim is made that he is someone able to appeal to both camps. This requires remaining on reasonable terms with both President Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, while manoeuvring for the top job. Earlier this week the editor of Business Day, Peter Bruce, even suggested that Sexwale and Mbeki could even make a double play. "Two good and (economically) like-minded leaders combining to get what they each want? Mbeki gets Tokyo's support to lead the party again. Mbeki backs Tokyo to become head of state."

Sexwale though has reason to resent Mbeki, and consequently Mbeki has cause to fear and distrust Sexwale's ultimate intentions towards him. Most famously, in April 2001 the Sunday Times reported that the Safety and Security Minister, Steve Tshwete, had told them that the police had, since the previous year, been investigating claims that Mbeki was "in ‘physical danger' from high profile leaders within the ANC who are plotting to oust him." A couple of days later Tshwete went on to national television and named Sexwale, Cyril Ramaphosa, and Mathews Phosa, as the individuals supposedly involved in the plot.

According to Bruce, and others, Mbeki and Sexwale have since "made up". Indeed, Sexwale was apparently recently seen entertaining Mbeki in Franschhoek. Yet, it would be surprising if all had been forgiven and forgotten, for the bad blood between the two men goes back a long way.

After becoming premier of Gauteng in 1994 Sexwale did little to disguise his ambitions, and he used his high public profile to position himself to challenge for the presidency. In May 1995 Africa Confidential claimed that then Deputy President Mbeki's office had allegedly issued a directive to SABC head, Zwelakhe Sisulu, requesting that Sexwale get less television coverage.

"The directive" it reported, "said that other provincial premiers had complained about their lack of national coverage: equally lowering Sexwale's profile will not do Mbeki any harm. Sexwale's aides say they expect a quiet few months, but afterwards the premier will be more demonstrative about his presidential aspirations."

Then in September 1996 Newton Kanhema, a journalist close to Sexwale, revealed in the Saturday Star that Mbeki had approached F.W. de Klerk shortly after the 1994 elections and asked him if any documents or evidence existed in state files concerning the involvement of Sexwale in alleged drug-dealing or other criminal activities.

In August 1994 Sexwale had written a letter of complaint to De Klerk, which he had copied to President Mandela. In it he stated, "I wish to draw your attention to a matter that has been brought to the attention of my office, which supposedly originates from your office - from your person in particular. The matter in question relates to a false allegation purportedly from yourself, directed to a senior member of the Government to the effect that some people, including myself, maybe be involved in criminal acts such as drug peddling." (Saturday Star 14^th September 1996)

Subsequently, Sexwale met with De Klerk on the 30^th September 1994. The conversation was recorded and Sexwale was given a tape of the discussion. In the meeting De Klerk told Sexwale that: "I had a discussion with a businessman and we were talking about the person who is likely to succeed Mandela. When the businessman suggested your name I said I doubted it because there were long knives out for you. I can assure you that this knife is not mine."

De Klerk also told Sexwale that at Mandela's presidential inauguration Mbeki came to him, "and said there were suspicions that you were involved in drugs. He said the ANC had information pointing in that direction. I have never heard any rumour about you... we would have used it against you during the election. I contacted intelligence and they gave me a paper which did not warrant anything being done and I gave that to Mr Mbeki." (Sunday Independent 15^th September 1996)

After these reports broke the then Safety and Security Minister, Sidney Mufamadi, stated that he had discussed the allegations with Mbeki back in 1994. He had then approached the commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe, to see whether any light could be shed on the matter. Van der Merwe told him the police were aware of the allegations but that they could not be substantiated. "They were not aware of anything beyond allegations. No one had given them information that was sufficient grounds to launch an investigation." (Citizen 16^th September 1996)

Kanhema reported shortly afterwards that, according to his sources on the ANC's national executive committee, there was a "perception among some" that Mbeki had gone "hunting for anything that could damage Sexwale's image, lest he became a strong contender for the presidency of the party." He further claimed that Sexwale was "bitter" because he believed he had "been betrayed by Mbeki and Mufamadi, who ‘threw him to the wolves' [De Klerk and Van der Merwe] to dredge up information on drug dealing."

A couple of months later there was yet further reason for discord between the two men. In an interview with the press in November 1996 Mandela described the idea that he had already chosen Mbeki as his successor as a misconception, as it was the NEC or conference that had the power to choose the party's president. This anodyne comment caused a brief fuss after Mandela briefed the NEC on the content of the interview.

An anonymous source told Kanhema that Mandela had told the NEC, "There has been a perception that I have already chosen my successor. There is talk that comrade Mbeki is the heir apparent but all this is not true. I have not chosen anyone to take over. The whole matter is in the hands of congress." The source further claimed that, "Everyone was shocked. I saw everyone with their heads down. We did not expect this, the race is on, but you can expect to see more people who are possible candidates being sidelined." The Star headlined Kanhema's report: "Mandela drops Mbeki bombshell: I have no heir apparent to the presidency, Madiba tells stunned ANC leaders" (11^th November 1996).

This interpretation was vigorously denied by both Mandela's office and the ANC. The New Nation fingered Sexwale as the source of the leak, speculating that he "may have had a hand" in the report in The Star. It claimed that "rumours implicating Sexwale remain strong in the party" and this had "tarnished his image". "It is believed" the newspaper reported, "that the organisation is determined to censure anyone found guilty of leaking the distorted interpretation of Mandela's attitude towards the race for the leadership of the organisation." The Hogarth column in the Sunday Times also claimed: "Although they have no proof, ANC insiders all point to Sexwale as the man who twisted Mandela's words."

After Sexwale announced his decision to quit active politics in the middle of 1997 the Mail & Guardian reported that the "ambitious premier" committed a "tactical error when he went one-on-one against Mbeki." The critical turning point came, it said, when he "he went to the press with the allegations against Mbeki" on the drug-trafficking issue in September the previous year. The article claimed that his opponents in the ANC regarded Sexwale "as a leader with much style but little substance. He was never regarded as one of the great political thinkers in the ANC." Sexwale meanwhile "believes he is a victim of Mbeki's intolerance of rivals within the party." He had also often expressed doubt to his inner circle that Mbeki was up to the job of running the country, telling them that "the president's [Mandela] shoes are huge and Thabo has tiny feet."

It could well be that the rough treatment Sexwale has received at the hands of the Mbeki-ites, including two police investigations, is by now just water under the bridge for him. Equally, he might just be following an astute political strategy. As Niccolò Machiavelli observed, it is foolish and imprudent to demand a thing from someone, and to say beforehand that once handed over it will be used to harm them. Rather, one should disguise one's intentions, while endeavouring "to obtain one's desires anyhow. For it is enough to ask a man to give up his arms, without telling him that you intend killing him with them; after you have the arms in hand, then you can do your will with them."

Daniel Kaufmann: 10 Myths About Governance and Corruption

2007-10-06T17:03:00.000Z

A quarterly magazine of the IMF

September 2005, Volume 42, Number 3

Back to Basics—10 Myths About Governance and Corruption

Daniel Kaufmann

Governance—which remains a sensitive and misunderstood topic—is now being given a higher priority in development circles. A few donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) have begun to work with some emerging economies to help reduce corruption, and encourage citizen voice, gender equality, and accountability. When the Group of Eight countries announced in July their decision to double aid and debt relief to the poorest countries in Africa, governance concerns were prominent. And in May, the joint report by the Africa Commission explicitly stated: "Good governance is the key... Unless there are improvements in capacity, accountability, and reducing corruption... other reforms will have only limited impact."

But is good governance and controlling corruption really so fundamental for development? The explosion of empirical research over the past decade, coupled with lessons from countries’ own experience, have given us a more solid basis for judging the effect of governance on development, and the effectiveness—or lack thereof—of strategies to improve it. Yet there are still unresolved questions and debates in the development community, not only about the importance of governance, but also about the ability of IFIs to help countries improve on it. Let us therefore go back to basics and address some prevailing "myths" about governance and corruption.

Myth #1: Governance and anticorruption are one and the same. We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension). By contrast, corruption is defined more narrowly as the "abuse of public office for private gain."

Myth #2: Governance and corruption cannot be measured. It is true that less than a dozen years ago virtually no internationally comparable measures of governance or corruption existed. But in recent years, the World Bank and others have sought to remedy this. At the World Bank, we have constructed aggregate governance indicators that cover more than 200 countries, based on more than 350 variables obtained from dozens of institutions worldwide. Our indicators cover the following six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of major violence and terror; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption.

Myth #3: The importance of governance and anti-corruption is overrated. Thanks to these and other advances in empirical measurement, a number of researchers have examined the impact of governance on development. The research generally shows that countries can derive a very large "development dividend" from better governance. We estimate that a country that improves its governance from a relatively low level to an average level could almost triple the income per capita of its population in the long term, and similarly reduce infant mortality and illiteracy. Such a relative improvement (by one standard deviation) would correspond, for instance, to a move up in our ranking for the "control of corruption" dimension in our database, taking Equatorial Guinea to the level of Uganda, Uganda to Lithuania, Lithuania to Portugal, and Portugal to Finland.

Governance also matters for a country’s competitiveness and for income distribution. In the case of corruption, research suggests it is equivalent to a major tax on foreign investors. In many developing countries, corruption represents a "regressive tax" on the household sector as well: lower income families pay a disproportionate share of their incomes in bribes to have access to public services (compared with higher income groups), and often end up with less access to such services because of corruption. A rough estimate of the extent of annual worldwide transactions that are tainted by corruption puts it close to $1 trillion.

To make matters worse, aid-funded projects tend to fail in corrupt settings. And corruption undermines fledgling democracies. Of course, governance is not the only thing that matters for development. Macroeconomic, trade, and sectoral policies are also important. But when governance is poor, policymaking in other areas is also compromised.

Myth #4: Governance is a luxury that only rich countries can afford. Some claim that the link between governance and incomes does not mean that better governance boosts incomes, but the reverse—higher incomes automatically translate into better governance. However, our research does not support this claim. It is thus misleading to suggest that corruption is due to low incomes, and invent a rationale for discounting bad governance in poor countries. In fact, the evidence points to the causality being in the direction of better governance leading to higher economic growth. A number of emerging economies, including the Baltics, Botswana, Chile, and Slovenia, have shown that it is possible to reach high standards of governance without yet having joined the ranks of wealthy nations.

Myth #5: It takes generations for governance to improve. While it is true that institutions often change only gradually, in some countries there has been a sharp improvement in the short term. This defies the view that while governance may deteriorate quickly, improvements are always slow and incremental. For instance, there has been a significant improvement since 1996 in the "voice and accountability" indicator in countries ranging from Bosnia, Croatia, and Ghana, to Indonesia, Serbia, and Sierra Leone. And the improvements exhibited by some African countries in a short period of time challenge the "Afro-pessimists." Even so, it is sobering that, on average, there has not been a worldwide improvement in overall governance during this period—and in a number of countries, including the Ivory Coast, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, there has been a sharp deterioration.

Myth #6: Donors can "ringfence" projects in highly corrupt countries and sectors. With the possible exception of some humanitarian aid projects, the notion that the aid community can insulate projects from an overall corrupt environment in a country is not borne out by the evidence. The data suggest that when a systemic approach to governance, civil liberties, rule of law, and control of corruption is absent, the likelihood of an aid-funded project being successful is greatly reduced.

Myth #7: Fight corruption by fighting corruption. A fallacy promoted by some in the field of anticorruption, and at times also by the international community, is that one "fights corruption by fighting corruption"—through yet another anticorruption campaign, the creation of more "commissions" and ethics agencies, and the incessant drafting of new laws, decrees, and codes of conduct. Overall, such initiatives appear to have little impact, and are often politically expedient ways of reacting to pressures to do something about corruption, substituting for the need for fundamental and systemic governance reforms.

Myth # 8: The culprit is the public sector in developing countries. A common fallacy is to focus solely on the failings of the public sector. The reality is much more complex, since powerful private interests often exert undue influence in shaping public policy, institutions, and state legislation. In extreme cases, "oligarchs" capture state institutions. And many multinational corporations still bribe abroad, undermining public governance in emerging economies. There are also weaknesses in the nongovernmental sector. Further, traditional public sector management interventions have not worked because they have focused on technocratic "fixes," often done through technical assistance importing hardware, organizational templates, and experts from rich countries.

Myth #9: There is little countries can do to improve governance. Given the long list of interventions that have not worked, as well as the role often ascribed to historical and cultural factors in explaining governance, it is easy to fall into the pessimist camp. That would be a mistake. First, historical and cultural factors are far from deterministic—witness, for instance, the diverging paths in terms of governance of neighboring countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America, the Korean peninsula, the transition economies of Eastern Europe, and in Southern Africa. Second, there are strategies that offer particular promise. The coupling of progress on improving voice and participation—including through freedom of expression and women’s rights—with transparency reforms (see box) can be particularly effective.

Toward a transparency reform scorecard

The data suggest that transparency helps improve governance and reduce corruption—essential ingredients for better development and faster economic growth. But there is a need for the development aid community to pay more attention to the issue. For that reason, at the World Bank Institute we have begun to construct an index to help make transparency more transparent. Further, in terms of reforms, a basic checklist, which countries may use for self-assessment, includes:

public disclosure of assets and incomes of candidates running for public office, public officials, politicians, legislators, judges, and their dependents;
public disclosure of political campaign contributions by individuals and firms, and of campaign expenditures;
public disclosure of all parliamentary votes, draft legislation, and parliamentary debates;
effective implementation of conflict of interest laws, separating business, politics, legislation, and public service, and adoption of a law governing lobbying;
publicly blacklisting firms that have been shown to bribe in public procurement (as done by the World Bank); and "publish-what-you-pay" by multinationals working in extractive industries;
effective implementation of freedom of information laws, with easy access for all to government information;
freedom of the media (including the Internet);
fiscal and public financial transparency of central and local budgets, adoption of the IMF’s Reports on Standards and Codes framework for fiscal transparency, detailed government reporting of payments from multinationals in extractive industries, and open meetings involving the country’s citizens;
disclosure of actual ownership structure and financial status of domestic banks;
transparent (web-based) competitive procurement;
country governance and anticorruption diagnostics and public expenditure tracking surveys (such as those supported by the World Bank); and
transparency programs at the city (and subnational) levels, including budgetary disclosure and open meetings.

Myth #10: There is not much the IFIs can do. Some development experts are skeptical about the ability of IFIs and donors to help countries improve their governance—either because of a conviction that "the ‘macro’ matters more," a mistaken belief in historical "determinism," or a view that the interventions needed to improve governance are politically sensitive and thus difficult for outsiders to encourage. Surely, there are areas that fall outside the mandate of IFIs, such as promotion of fair multiparty elections. But initiatives to encourage transparency, freedom of information and an independent media, participatory anticorruption programs led by the country, and gender equality—all of which have been underemphasized so far in the fight against corruption—may well be within the ability of IFIs and donors to do something about. Such initiatives, complemented by supporting targeted reform of highly vulnerable institutions (which often include procurement, tax, customs, or the judiciary) offer much promise.

* * * * *

The challenge of governance and anticorruption confronting the world today strongly argues against the "business-as-usual" modus operandi. A bolder approach is needed, and collective responsibility at the global level is called for. The rich world must not only deliver on its aid and trade liberalization promises, it must also lead by example. OECD countries should ratify and effectively implement the 2003 UN convention against corruption, and take steps (as Switzerland is starting to do) to repatriate assets looted and stashed abroad by corrupt officials. And transnational corporations should refrain from bribery and support improving governance practices in host countries. As for the IFIs and donors, there is a need to grapple with questions of selectivity and effectiveness in aid programs, anchoring aid decisions within a governance prism and helping countries build capacity to effectively absorb aid. Improving transparency will be key. Finally, countries themselves must take the lead in improving governance.

References:

Bellver, Ana, and Daniel Kaufmann, 2005, "Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (forthcoming) (Washington)

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

Commission for Africa Report, 2005, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa (London)

http://www.commissionforafrica.org

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2005, "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3237 (Washington)

http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html

Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003, "Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy," Global Competitiveness Report 2002–03, World Economic Forum, Geneva

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/ rethink_gov.html

World Bank Institute, 2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development (Washington).

Ashraf Ghani on rebuilding broken states

2007-10-06T16:52:00.000Z

Talks Ashraf Ghani: How to fix broken states

About this Talk

"The aid system is broken," says Ashraf Ghani in this powerful, reform-oriented talk. He discusses how to mobilize capital for state-building; why technical assistance fails; and why classic economic theory proved useless in Afghanistan, which is "dominated by the drug economy and a mafia." He emphasizes the necessity of investment ("A dollar in private investment is equal to 20 dollars of aid") and design ingenuity to rebuild broken states. And he offers a blueprint: the 10 key functions that a state should perform, from providing infrastructure to enforcing the rule of law.

Speaker Ashraf Ghani: Expert on state-building

Ashraf Ghani was a key figure in rebuilding Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, and is a leading advocate for foreign investment (rather than foreign aid) as a tool for economic development and the eradication of poverty.

Why you should listen to him:

Before Afghanistan's President Karzai asked him, at the end of 2001, to become his adviser and then Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani had spent years in academia studying state-building and social transformation, and a decade in executive positions at the World Bank trying to effect policy in these two fields. In just 30 months, he carried out radical and effective reforms (a new currency, new budget, new tariffs, etc.) and was instrumental in preparing for the elections of October 2004.

In 2006, he was a candidate to succeed Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the United Nations. He's currently the Chancellor of Kabul University, where he runs a program on state effectiveness. His message to the world: "Afghanistan should not be approached as a charity, but as an investment."

"Ghani's management skills, which sparked an economic revival in post-Taliban Afghanistan, earned him Asia's vote as the best finance minister on the continent."
The New York Sun

Economic trends: South Africa's position drops in global ease of doing business rankings.

2007-10-06T16:35:00.000Z

We're sinking!

South Africa's position drops in global ease of doing business rankings.

Felicity Duncan

27 Set 2007

If the World Bank is right, South Africa has been steadily slipping behind in the ease of doing business ranks.

Every year, the World Bank publishes the Doing Business Report, which looks at the regulations various countries impose on businesses that make doing business more difficult. In 2006, South Africa ranked 28^th in the world, a respectable showing. We slipped to 29^th in 2007, and in the latest rankings, for 2008, we are down to 35.

While South Africa has not necessarily been moving backwards in terms of the ease of doing business in our country, other countries have been reforming rapidly as globalisation becomes an ever-more present reality.

The table bellows summarises the information contained in the 2008 report. It compares South Africa with the global best and worst, and the SADC best on all the categories the report considers.

Some points are worth highlighting. South Africa does well in the investor protection stakes, and has relatively reasonable cost structures overall. But there are several areas in which we perform poorly.

Note the relatively long time it takes to start a business in South Africa, especially when compared to our SADC cousin Madagascar. South Africa's employment rigidity index is also high relative to our neighbors in Swaziland. Finally, our corporate tax rate is relatively high.

	World Best	World Worst	South Africa	SADC Best

Starting a business
Number of procedures	2 (Australia)	20 (Equatorial Guinea)	8	5 (Madagascar)
Time (days)	2 (Australia)	694 (Suriname)	31	7 (Madagascar)
Cost (% of per capita income	0 (Denmark)	1075.2 (Sierra Leone)	7.1	5.3 (Mauritius)
Paid in minimum capital (% of per capita income)	0 (Various)	3673 (Syria)	0	0 (Various)

Dealing with licenses (using construction as an example)
Number of procedures	6 (Denmark)	54 (Russia)	17	12 (Namibia)
Time to deal with licenses (days)	34 (Korea)	1179 (Haiti)	174	93 (Swaziland)
Cost (% of per capita income)	1.5 (United Arab Emirates)	61049 (Liberia)	30.4	30.4 (South Africa)

Employing workers
Rigidity of employment index	0 (Hong Kong)	79 (Venezuela)	42	17 (Swaziland)
Firing costs (weeks of salary)	0 (Various)	Not possible (Venezeula)	24	446 (Zimbabwe)
Non-wage costs (% of salary)	0 (Various)	55 (Belgium)	3.8	0 (Botswana)

Registering property
Procedures	1 (Norway)	14 (Nigeria)	6	4 (Botswana)
Time (days)	2 (New Zealand)	513 (Kiribati)	24	23 (Namibia)
Cost (% of property value)	0 (Saudi Arabia)	28.1 (Syria)	8.8	3.3 (Malawi)

Getting credit
Borrowers covered by credit bureax (% of adults)	100 (Various)	0.02 (Guinea)	52.1	59.9 (Namibia)
Strength of legal rights index	10 (Hong Kong, China)	0 (Cambodia)	5	7 (Botswana)

Protecting investors
Strength of investor protection index	9.7 (New Zealand)	0 (Afghanistan)	8	8 (South Africa)

Paying taxes
Payments (number per year)	1 (Maldives)	124 (Belarus)	11	7 (Mauritius)
Time to administer (hours per year)	0 (Maldives)	2600 (Brazil)	350	76 (Seychelles)
Total tax rate (% of profit)	8.4 (Vanuatu)	286 (Gambia)	37	16 (Zambia)

Trading across borders
Documents to export	3 (Various)	13 (Fiji)	8	4 (Madagascar)
Documents to import	3 (Various)	18 (Central African Republic)	9	5 (Seychelles)
Time to export (days)	5 (Denmark)	102 (Iraq)	30	17 (Mauritius)
Time to import (days)	3 (Singapore)	104 (Uzbekistan)	35	16 (Mauritius)
Cost to export (per container $)	390 (China)	4867 (Chad)	1087	728 (Mauritius)
Cost to import (per container $)	367 (Singapore)	5520 (Chad)	1195	673 (Mauritius)

Enforcing contacts
Procedures	20 (Ireland)	58 (Brunei)	30	29 (Botswana)
Time (days)	120 (Singapore)	1800 (Timor-Leste)	600	270 (Nambia)
Cost (% of claim)	0.1 (Bhutan)	163.2 (Timor-Leste)	33.2	14.3 (Tanzania)

Closing a business (bankrupcy law)
Time to go through insolvency (years)	0.4 (Ireland)	10 (India)	2	1.5 Namibia
Cost (% of estate)	1 (Colombia)	76 (Central African Republic)	18	8 (Lesotho)

Brasil: Anti-Corrupção em debate no Senado Federal a propósito de Kaufmann

2007-10-06T16:15:00.000Z

Senado Federal Pronunciamento Completo
Autor	Demostenes Torres (PFL - Partido da Frente Liberal /GO)
Data	06/09/2005	Casa	Senado Federal	Tipo	Discurso

O Dr. Daniel Kaufmann, Diretor de Programas Globais do Instituto Banco Mundial, ouviu em português, entendeu em inglês, mas, se quisesse, teria desconfiado em espanhol ou em hebraico que o Excelentíssimo Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, fazia caçoada quando declarou que cortaria a própria carne para salvar o Brasil das saúvas do PT. Na ocasião, o economista estava em Brasília, na condição de chefe da delegação do Banco Mundial perante o IV Fórum Global Anticorrupção, realizado entre 7 e 10 de junho, onde o Presidente Lula falou o que não ia fazer.

PhD em Harvard, Mr. Kaufmann pensa que a qualidade do Governo é a chave para o desenvolvimento do Terceiro Mundo e certamente não se deixou impressionar pelo ambiente corrosivo da Capital. Não havia a seca de setembro, mas a situação não estava sopa. À véspera, o Deputado Roberto Jefferson tinha estabelecido o dia D do escândalo do mensalão, após entrevista à Folha de S.Paulo. Na abertura do fórum, no auditório do Blue Tree, enquanto autoridades exercitavam a memória em busca de repasses de malas no sofisticado estabelecimento hoteleiro, o ex-Presidente do PTB acenava que tinha mais maldade na caixinha. Naquele 7 de junho, ouviu-se a palavra impeachment pela primeira vez. O Governo Lula estava de luz amarela acesa. O Deputado Valdemar Costa Neto foi para o ataque e o professor Delúbio Soares mantido na Tesouraria Geral do PT. Já Mr. Kaufmann declarou que, na América Latina, somente o Chile, e mais ninguém, havia atingido o grau avançado de combate à corrupção. E o Brasil? Está estagnado entre os medíocres.

O economista acabou de publicar um interessante artigo na revista Finanças & Desenvolvimento, editada pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional, intitulado "Dez mitos sobre o governo e a corrupção", o material de Mr. Kaufmann estima que um processo de governabilidade responsável, centrado no controle da corrupção, poderia no longo prazo fazer com que a Guiné Ocidental se tornasse uma Uganda; que Uganda viesse a ter o nível de percepção da Lituânia; que a Lituânia chegasse a Portugal; e, por fim, que Portugal alcançasse a Finlândia. Dr. Daniel Kaufmann projetou que o controle da corrupção poderia fazer com que se triplicasse a renda per capita de países como Vera Cruz, com efeito imediato na redução da mortalidade infantil e do analfabetismo. Para o cientista, a corrupção é aquilo que o Brasil sabe. É cruelmente danosa com as pessoas de baixa renda, pois são sobretaxadas nos seus ganhos e no consumo, e não possuem acesso aos serviços essenciais.

O Presidente Lula não sabia de nada. Caso tivesse prestado atenção no que se passou no IV Fórum Global de Combate à Corrupção, especialmente no que pensa Mr. Kaufmann, com alguma certeza teria cortado a própria carne para que o Brasil deixasse o ciclo do baixo crescimento econômico, da ameaça inflacionária e dos custos sociais altíssimos da política monetária. Saberia que missões clandestinas, a exemplo da empreendida pelo Sr. Marcos Valério a Portugal, afugentam os investidores. O Presidente seria cientificado de que a baixa qualidade da infra-estrutura está associada aos planos não-republicanos do Deputado José Dirceu. Para um homem que não sabia rigorosamente de nada, talvez passasse a ter noção óbvia de que a corrupção traz o legado da fome, causa depressão, mantém o Brasil entre os piores em saneamento básico e faz dinâmica a evolução da pobreza. Teria se informado de que a ação perniciosa de certo Silvio Pereira reduz a produtividade do setor público. Poderia, então, ter mínimo entendimento de que acordo espúrio, como o celebrado com o ex-Deputado Valdemar Costa Neto, corrói o caráter obrigatório das normas legais. Desmoraliza o Estado. Enfraquece as instituições e torna ilegítima a disputa eleitoral, além de provocar indignação, é claro!

Sr. Presidente, Srªs e Srs. Senadores, o sobrevivente do Palácio do Planalto está convencido de que sai caminhando da crise do mensalão caso consiga restringir o escândalo no terreno do meramente declaratório. Da parte do próprio - parece crucial - o plano é o "nada a declarar!" Já as faladas instituições, em estratégia de defesa, vão continuar acusando a Oposição de denuncista, de emitir declaração caluniosa, embora os companheiros do PT e da base adquirida sejam a fonte da má notícia. Em uma atitude delirante, os remanescentes cuidarão, das respectivas Pastas, de escarnecer do trabalho da imprensa e de diminuir a função vanguardista dos veículos de comunicação na transparência do sistema de corrupção engendrado pelo PTbrás.

A Esquerda ama se vitimizar das conspirações lacerdistas e alimenta a ilusão de que a liberdade de imprensa é a causa do infortúnio. Ao mesmo tempo, vale-se do domínio da fala para fazer fato o inverossímil declaratório da tal agenda positiva.

A partir da próxima semana, o programa radiofônico "Café com o Presidente" passará a ser semanal. Como em nem todo domingo o Brasil ganha de 5x0, as manhãs de segunda-feira poderão revelar regresso no otimismo chapa-branca.

(Interrupção do som.)

A SRª PRESIDENTE (Serys Slhessarenko. Bloco/PT - MT. Fazendo soar a campainha.) - V. Exª já ultrapassou o seu tempo em oito minutos, Senador Demóstenes Torres.

O SR. DEMÓSTENES TORRES (PFL - GO) - Muito obrigado.

No programa de ontem, por exemplo, o Presidente Lula usou metade do tempo para anunciar um feito já comemorado na antevéspera e requentou o improvável êxito da Campanha do Desarmamento.

Sr. Presidente, no último sábado, o Ministro da Justiça, Márcio Thomaz Bastos, havia renovado o encontro com a glória das suas atribuições institucionais. Como a Campanha do Desarmamento é dele, ao titular devia ser reconhecida a condição de salvador de 3.234 almas. O número é o saldo a menor no índice do Ministério da Saúde sobre os homicídios provocados por arma de fogo em 2004 em relação ao ano anterior - resultado revolucionário, diria petista engajado nos tempos em que era oculto o amigo mensalão.

A tendência é positiva, mas de pouco significado real. Já a avaliação do Dr. Bastos consagra o que não lhe pertence e nem ao Presidente Lula! A causa da diminuição desse tipo de homicídio deve-se à política de segurança empreendida pelas polícias estaduais. Os Governadores estão pregando aos peixes por verbas para a segurança pública desde a ascensão de janeiro de 2003 de Lula ao poder. No conjunto dos dados, somente São Paulo contribuiu com 61% na redução do indicador. O Ministro da Justiça, panglossiano que é, fez o apelo ao formidável. Concluiu, antes de explicar. Em momento de auto-admirativo, observou que as Unidades da Federação, vanguardistas no declínio de mortes por arma de fogo, foram justamente as que abrigam sociedades organizadas que, em nome da Paloma, de Picasso, mais acorreram à Campanha do Desarmamento.

Elementar, só que a parte desmente o todo. Na região metropolitana de São Paulo, continuam em circulação mais de 1,3 milhão de armas ilegais. O último boletim do "desarmamômetro" do Dr. Bastos registrou a entrega voluntária de 430 mil armas em todo o País. Se o índice de homicídios com emprego de arma de fogo caiu, não foi por que assassinos potenciais depuseram os meios por conta de R$100,00. Para o Ministro da Justiça, a campanha é uma legenda e foi observada por 8,2% de qualificados cidadãos. Pretendiam matar alguém, mas refluíram a tempo, depois do "rolando o lero" do Dr. Bastos, o codificador.

O crime também possui avaliação de risco e propaga-se à razão direta do comportamento líquido do Estado.

(Interrupção do som.)

O SR. DEMÓSTENES TORRES (PFL - GO) - Vou apenas concluir, Srª Presidente.

A SRª PRESIDENTE (Serys Slhessarenko. Bloco/PT - MT) - Senador Demóstenes Torres, V. Exª já ultrapassou 11 minutos do seu tempo e, como V. Exª está falando pela Liderança, teria direito a cinco minutos. Está concedido a V. Exª mais um minuto.

O SR. DEMÓSTENES TORRES (PFL - GO) - A lei, em si, não tem o condão de promover alterações de condutas. Depende da efetividade das políticas no texto consagradas. Campanhas de publicidade não convencem criminosos a deixar a vida bandida. No Governo Lula, ao contrário, são o portfólio das organizações mafiosas. No Orçamento de 2005, o Governo do PT investiu, das verbas do Sistema Nacional de Segurança Pública, R$0,11 na proteção de cada brasileiro. Nas contas do Dr. Bastos, foi uma pechincha. Para manter a sobrevida dos 3.234 não-abatidos, até agora o Governo Lula gastou R$555,74. Com o dinheiro economizado, vai sobrar verba publicitária para fazer o espetáculo do "sim" no referendo de outubro. O Dr. Bastos é um talento!

Muito obrigado, Srª Presidente.

Patrick Awuah: Educating a new generation of African leaders

2007-10-06T15:39:00.000Z

About this Talk

Patrick Awuah left a comfortable life in Seattle to return to Ghana and co-found, against the odds, a liberal arts college. Why? Because he believes that Ghana's failures in leadership -- and he gives several mind-boggling examples -- stem from a university system that fails to train real leaders. In a talk that brought the TEDGlobal audience enthusiastically to their feet, he explains how a true liberal arts education -- steeped in critical thinking, idealism, and public service -- can produce the quick-thinking, ethical leaders needed to move his country forward.

Speaker Patrick Awuah: University founder

After working at Microsoft for almost a decade, Patrick Awuah returned home to Ghana and cofounded Ashesi University, a small liberal arts college that aims to educate Africa's next generation of leaders. Its first class of students graduated in 2006.

Why you should listen to him:

Awuah left Ghana as a teenager to attend Swarthmore College in the United States, then stayed on to build a career at Microsoft in Seattle. In returning to his home country, he has made a commitment to educating young people in critical thinking and ethical service, values he believes are crucial for the nation-building that lies ahead. Founded in 2002, his Ashesi University is already charting a new course in African education, with its high-tech facilities, innovative academic program and emphasis on leadership. It seems more than fitting that ashesi means "beginning" in Akan, one of Ghana's native languages.

Kaufmann: ''A longo prazo, o controle da corrupção é crucial para o crescimento e o desenvolvimento "

2007-10-06T15:18:00.000Z

ENTREVISTA com D. KAUFMANN

“Siga o dinheiro”

Assim o Brasil descobrirá o caminho para reduzir a corrupção. Vencer essa guerra é essencial para o país crescer, diz o diretor do Banco Mundial

Durante o caso Watergate, quando o jornalista Bob Woodward estava tendo dificuldade de juntar as pontas para decifrar o esquema de corrupção no governo Richard Nixon, ele ouviu um conselho célebre de Mark Felt, sua fonte de informações no FBI, tornada famosa pelo apelido Garganta Profunda. "Follow the money" (Siga o dinheiro), disse Felt. Woodward e Carl Bernstein, seu parceiro no jornal Washington Post, seguiram a trilha do dinheiro e abriram o caminho da renúncia de Nixon à Presidência dos Estados Unidos. Três décadas depois, o mesmo conselho é dado ao Brasil por Daniel Kaufmann, diretor de governança global do Banco Mundial e uma das maiores autoridades do mundo em combate à corrupção. Essa é a receita de Kaufmann para evitar a proliferação de escândalos como o das sanguessugas do Orçamento. O monitoramento independente e constante do caminho do dinheiro público - para saber onde ele vai parar - é uma das melhores fórmulas para tornar o controle orçamentário mais rígido e transparente. Para o economista, se as lideranças políticas tiverem vontade e tomarem as medidas corretas, é possível num prazo de oito anos reduzir a corrupção no Brasil aos níveis toleráveis de países mais desenvolvidos.

Daniel Kaufmann

Quem é ele ?

Economista formado na Universidade Hebraica de Jerusalém, com mestrado e doutorado em Harvard

O que ele faz ?

É diretor do Banco Mundial, especialista em reforma do sector público, governança e combate à corrupção.

ÉPOCA - O Parlamento brasileiro vive uma crise sem precedentes por causa da corrupção. Qual pode ser a conseqüência da desmoralização do Legislativo?

Daniel Kaufmann - Se o Executivo não é cobrado pelo Congresso, isso já é um sinal de corrupção. É extremamente importante que haja um Parlamento com integridade, com comissões sérias para controle orçamentário, para cuidar das contas públicas com transparência, para criar comissões anticorrupção e desafiar o Poder Executivo. Isso garante o equilíbrio do Estado.

ÉPOCA - O que pode ser feito para controlar o Orçamento e evitar a corrupção?

Kaufmann - O Orçamento pode ser uma grande fonte de corrupção. Nos Estados Unidos, há muitos anos um ladrão de bancos foi pego e questionado por que fazia aquilo. "É ali que o dinheiro está", respondeu. É o mesmo raciocínio em relação ao Orçamento. É um lugar óbvio para o corrupto concentrar o foco. Uma boa fórmula de começar a controlar o Orçamento e evitar a corrupção é: siga o dinheiro. Uma ferramenta importante usada por vários países é o levantamento e rastreamento de despesas públicas. Por exemplo: o governo destina dinheiro à educação. Esse levantamento independente é feito por uma instituição fora do governo. Ela vai a um número de escolas para descobrir quanto foi recebido e como o dinheiro é usado. Em alguns casos, há o envolvimento da associação da comunidade no processo. Em países onde isso aconteceu, foi descoberta uma grande diferença entre o valor que deveria ser enviado e o valor que as escolas receberam. É preciso monitoramento claro e transparente de gastos.

ÉPOCA - Existe uma receita para combater a corrupção?

Kaufmann - Há ferramentas para diagnosticar quais os maiores problemas de corrupção num país. Recentemente, aconselhamos autoridades da Guatemala e do Quênia. Nós os ajudamos com pesquisas sobre seus cidadãos, usuários de serviços e empresas. Os servidores públicos fizeram suas pesquisas, um relatório detalhado dos problemas, para um diagnóstico. É assim que as prioridades são destacadas. Deve haver vontade política por parte das lideranças. Não apenas do líder do país, mas também no Parlamento, no Judiciário, na sociedade civil e no setor privado.

ÉPOCA - Que países obtiveram sucesso nessa luta?

Kaufmann - Países como os Estados Unidos eram extremamente corruptos no passado. A polícia de Nova York era dominada pela corrupção. O Reino Unido também foi corrupto e levou cem anos para melhorar. Há casos como Chile e Botsuana, que apresentam níveis mais baixos de corrupção que alguns países desenvolvidos.

ÉPOCA - Como eles reduziram a corrupção?

Kaufmann - Eles tiveram ações de combate apoiadas pela vontade política de lideranças. A corrupção é tipicamente um sintoma de fraqueza em algumas áreas de governança. Em alguns países, e não é o caso do Brasil, há pouca responsabilidade democrática e liberdade de imprensa. No Leste Asiático e na antiga União Soviética, havia restrições à imprensa e às liberdades civis. Aquela velha noção de que devemos apenas acreditar em instituições governamentais não funciona.

ÉPOCA - Como o Brasil está em relação ao resto do mundo?

Kaufmann - O Brasil está na média. Podemos dizer que o copo está "meio cheio". De acordo com nossos indicadores, para o Brasil não acendeu a luz vermelha. Está sempre amarela. Em termos de indicadores de governança (o Banco Mundial avalia 204 países quanto à corrupção), o Brasil está exatamente no meio, na 100a posição. Então podemos dizer que o copo está meio cheio. Por outro lado, podemos dizer que está meio vazio. É uma pergunta que os brasileiros devem fazer. Onde queremos estar? Por que o Brasil não tem uma luz verde? Progresso significativo é possível. Isso aconteceu no Chile, em Botsuana e em países do Leste Europeu. Eles estão ficando cada vez mais verdes. Não acontece da noite para o dia, porque não se pode transformar uma Guiné Equatorial numa Finlândia rapidamente. Mas também não é necessário esperar 30 ou 50 anos. Em um período entre seis e oito anos, um país pode mudar.

''A longo prazo, o controle da corrupção é crucial para o crescimento e o desenvolvimento. Um país com muita corrupção é mais vulnerável a crises econômicas''

ÉPOCA - Então reduzir significativamente a corrupção não é um processo demorado?

Kaufmann - É possível com reformas e vontade política. O importante é ver que o Brasil está na média. Deixo a pergunta: o copo está meio cheio ou meio vazio? Poderíamos fazer a mesma pergunta sobre a Índia e o México. Eles estão na mesma situação. Brasil, México e Índia são poderosas economias emergentes. São avaliados como medianos em termos de governança e corrupção. Estão no meio do grupo. Não é suficiente estar satisfeito com um copo meio cheio. É necessário olhar ambiciosamente para a parte que está vazia e perguntar como estaremos em dez anos.

ÉPOCA - Há algum exemplo de país corrupto que tenha atingido alto estágio de desenvolvimento?

Kaufmann - A longo prazo, o controle da corrupção é crucial para o crescimento e para o desenvolvimento. Isso não quer dizer que alguns países não tenham momentos de crescimento com índice alto de corrupção. Mas por períodos de dez anos, no máximo. Vimos que Bangladesh apresentou boa performance de crescimento, mas tem sérios problemas de corrupção e governança. Perguntam-me sempre como países como a Indonésia cresceram rapidamente com sérios problemas de corrupção. Mas a Indonésia quebrou. Um país com muita corrupção é mais vulnerável e exposto a crises econômicas.

ÉPOCA - A internet é uma arma contra corruptos?

Kaufmann - Sim. Atualmente, há uma ênfase maior nas medidas de transparência. Por exemplo, um site para checar os bens e a renda dos políticos, outro para checar qual político votou em qual lei e um terceiro mostrando que grande empresa ou empresário contribuiu para aquele político. Tudo de forma organizada para o eleitor se acostumar a navegar pelo site. Precisamos lembrar que existe o outro lado da moeda. A internet é inteligentemente usada como ferramenta pelo crime organizado. Não há como escapar do uso dela para combatê-lo.

ÉPOCA - A corrupção pode ser uma ameaça para a democracia?

Kaufmann - Sim. A corrupção enfraquece a legitimidade das instituições democráticas aos olhos dos cidadãos. Onde há mais corrupção, os cidadãos participam menos nas instituições democráticas. Felizmente, os cidadãos da América Latina não pensam em alternativas à democracia. Mas mostram claramente que seu apoio a ela é menor quando há mais corrupção. Os contribuintes sabem que os impostos não serão usados no fornecimento dos serviços públicos que esperam e estarão menos propensos a pagá-los. Isso diminui a renda do Estado.

Governance Matters 2007- Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2006

2007-10-06T14:13:00.000Z

What is Governance?

Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

" One of the best kept secrets at the World Bank is their World Bank Country Governance Indicators ."

Gordon Johnson,

Co-Founder, Center for Privatization, Washington, DC

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) projectreports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories over the period 1996–2006, for six dimensions of governance:

	Voice and Accountability
	Political Stability and Absence of Violence
	Government Effectiveness
	Regulatory Quality
	Rule of Law
	Control of Corruption

The aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. The individual data sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.

The six aggregate indicators and the underlying data sources can be viewed interactively on the Governance Indicators webpage . Documentation of the latest update of the WGI can be found in "Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996–2006." Further documentation and research using the WGI is available on the Resources page of this website or at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999979

Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006 DANIEL KAUFMANN

World Bank Institute

AART KRAAY

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

MASSIMO MASTRUZZI

World Bank - Research Department July 2007

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280Abstract:

This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2006: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. This latest set of aggregate indicators, are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. We also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. We find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions.

Euvin Naidoo: Africa as an investment

2007-10-06T04:22:00.001Z

About this Talk

In the talk that opened TEDGlobal 2007 ("Africa: The Next Chapter"), South African investment banker Euvin Naidoo sets the scene, framing the conversation that would unfold over the four-day event. "What's the worst thing you've heard about Africa?" he asks. After fielding call-outs of "famine," "war," "corruption," he urges the audience to move past these preconceptions -- and offers a compelling picture of a continent on the cusp of enormous change.

Speaker Euvin Naidoo: Investment banker

As president of the South African Chamber of Commerce - America, Euvin Naidoo works with leading corporations and governments to strengthen trans-Atlantic economic ties.

Why you should listen to him:

Euvin Naidoo wants to change your mind about Africa. Armed with facts, figures and a forward-looking outlook, he conveys a nuanced picture of a continent that's large, diverse and full of potential, with stabilizing economies and business growth. Speaking at TED in a personal capacity, he offers persuasive reasons why the continent's challenges should be reframed as opportunities, and why investing in Africa can make great business sense.

Based in Manhattan, Naidoo focuses on acquisition finance and private-equity transactions for emerging markets in Latin America and Africa. A third-generation South African, he spent four years as a consultant with McKinsey & Co., and holds an MBA from Harvard.

NIGERIA : L'éveil d'un géant

2007-10-06T02:56:00.000Z

A propósito do dream team de Obasanjo, vale a pena recuarmos até 10 de Julho de 2005, a fim de relermos este artigo de Abdelaziz Barrouhi, publicado no dossier da revista Jeune Afrique e dedicada às reformas e ao combate à corrupção na Nigéria . Só à luz deste desígnio se entenderá a razão da necessidade de estabilidade e continuidade...

La « dream team » d'Obasanjo

Abdelaziz Barrouhi

Le président a dépêché des spécialistes au chevet de l’économie du pays. Des technocrates triés sur le volet, apolitiques et bardés de diplômes.

Les fans de foot, admirateurs de Jay Jay Okocha, Yakubu Ayegbeni et Obafemi Martins, ont de tout temps rêvé d'une équipe nationale gagnante qu'ils appellent la dream team - l'équipe de rêve. Un nom qu'ils ont naturellement repris pour désigner le groupe de technocrates qu'Olusegun Obasanjo a chargés, en juin 2003, de mener à bien les réformes économiques destinées à jeter les fondations du renouveau. Quant au président, il appelle les membres de cette équipe ses « disciples », pour utiliser un langage religieux dont il est familier. Ce n'est pas exagéré, quand on sait que l'homme de la rue n'hésite pas à dire d'eux qu'ils sont « envoyés par Dieu ».

Choisis parmi l'élite intellectuelle du pays, bardés de diplômes et souvent formés aux États-Unis et en Grande-Bretagne, ces technocrates sont presque tous apolitiques, contrairement aux pratiques anciennes où seuls les hommes d'appareil - souvent corrompus - tenaient le haut du pavé dans l'exécutif.

Chaque semaine, il réunit cette équipe pendant quatre-vingt-dix minutes, juste avant la tenue du Conseil des ministres. Certains de ses membres figurent au rang des plus proches conseillers à la présidence, d'autres occupent des ministères ou des institutions clés, d'autres encore dirigent les organismes spécialisés autonomes qui lui sont directement rattachés.

Au nombre de quelques dizaines, ils comptent parmi eux quelques personnalités : le Pr Charles Soludo, gouverneur de la Banque centrale ; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, ministre des Finances ; Nuhu Ribadu, patron de la lutte contre la corruption ; Nasir el-Rufaï, ministre du District de la capitale fédérale, Abuja ; Oby Ezekwesili, conseillère spéciale du président Obasanjo pour le budget.

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala

Madame Solutions

Première Nigériane à devenir ministre des Finances, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala a considérablement contribué, depuis 2003, à ce que les institutions financières internationales prennent au sérieux la volonté de son pays de réformer son économie et d'utiliser ses revenus pétroliers pour lutter contre la pauvreté. Diplômée d'Harvard et titulaire d'un PhD en économie du développement du Massachusetts Institute of Technologie (MIT), où elle a également travaillé entre 1976 et 1981, elle est entrée à la Banque mondiale comme économiste en 1982, pour ne la quitter qu'en 2003. En une vingtaine d'années de carrière à la Banque, elle a gravi les échelons jusqu'à en devenir le numéro trois, en tant que vice-présidente et secrétaire générale. Obasanjo l'a appelée à ses côtés au début de son second mandat, en juin 2003.

Juste après sa nomination, deux départements vitaux, la planification et le budget, ont failli être soustraits au contrôle de son ministère. Elle a aussitôt menacé de démissionner, obligeant le chef de l'État à faire machine arrière. Depuis deux ans, elle s'attache à mettre de l'ordre dans les finances du pays en introduisant plus de transparence, notamment en publiant dans les médias le montant des allocations versées aux États de la fédération, qui absorbent une large part du budget national. Elle a aussi fait avancer la cause de la réduction de la dette extérieure. « Elle est dynamique et brillante, c'est Madame Solutions », dit d'elle l'un de ses collaborateurs. Reconnaissable à ses pagnes traditionnels, cette battante au sourire avenant a fêté ses 50 ans le 13 juin.

Charles Soludo

L'apôtre des réformes

Âgé de 45 ans, Charles Soludo est au centre des grandes réformes de l'économie nigériane. Il a supervisé la mise au point de la Needs (Stratégie nationale de maîtrise et de développement économiques) comme conseiller économique en chef d'Obasanjo et président de la Commission nationale de la planification de juillet 2003 à mai 2004. Il a engagé, depuis juillet 2004, en tant que gouverneur de la Banque centrale du Nigeria (CBN), une profonde réforme du secteur bancaire qui, si elle réussit, fera de lui son sauveur. Professeur d'économie, il est l'un des plus fins analystes de la problématique du développement au Nigeria. Selon lui, l'économie n'a pas apporté de bénéfices tangibles aux citoyens. Et la faute en revient essentiellement à « l'État rentier qui perpétue une politique du partage des recettes pétrolières plutôt que de la production ».

Oby Ezekwesili

Transparence d'abord

Directrice de l'unité pour le contrôle du budget et des prix, elle est l'une des fiertés du pays pour son rôle dans la lutte contre la corruption, dit d'elle Obasanjo, dont elle est aussi la conseillère spéciale en matière budgétaire. Oby Ezekwesili a contribué à assainir les processus de passation des marchés publics. Son contrôle minutieux des contrats en cours a permis de découvrir un gonflement des montants, et ainsi fait économiser à l'État près de 1 milliard de dollars ces deux dernières années. Ezekwesili s'est distinguée en matière de bonne gouvernance et de développement. Diplômée en administration publique de la Government Kennedy School d'Harvard, elle a notamment été directrice financière de Transparency International. Elle a aussi exercé dans le privé comme consultante en audit comptable.

Mais elle a encore du pain sur la planche, notamment en matière de recouvrement de la part des revenus pétroliers qui revient au Nigeria dans les contrats de partage avec les compagnies étrangères. Car, en ce domaine, l'opacité règne. Or la récente adhésion d'Abuja à l'Initiative sur la transparence des industries extractives (EITI) requiert plus de coopération de la part des compagnies étrangères. Stricte et soucieuse du détail, elle a introduit une discipline rigoureuse dans la préparation et l'exécution du budget de l'État. Inutile de dire que les politiciens se méfient d'elle et que les entreprises adjudicataires la prennent désormais au sérieux. D'ailleurs, elle va faire son entrée au gouvernement dans les prochains jours.

Nasir el-Rufaï

La détermination au pouvoir

Il est l'un des Nigérians les plus brillants de la génération montante. Âgé de 45 ans, il est bardé de diplômes décrochés dans les plus prestigieuses universités américaines. Après un passage dans le privé, il est entré au service de l'État comme directeur général du Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), organisme chargé des privatisations. En juillet 2003, lorsqu'il l'a nommé ministre du District d'Abuja, Obasanjo lui a simplement dit : « Nettoie-moi la capitale ! » Et c'est ce que Rufaï est en train de faire. Il a d'abord « nettoyé » l'administration de la ville en supprimant 5 000 emplois fictifs et en remettant à la disposition de la fonction publique 2 000 autres employés. Puis il a commencé à « nettoyer » la ville des constructions sauvages qui y ont proliféré sur fond d'escroqueries et de corruption. Pour cela, il fait respecter le plan d'aménagement de l'agglomération, en ordonnant la démolition, effective depuis mai, de centaines de constructions dont la propriété et le permis de construire ne sont pas enregistrés. Ce qui l'oblige à s'attaquer à de puissantes personnalités. Il n'en craint pas les conséquences sur sa carrière politique. « Je ne suis pas un politicien, car un politicien ne ferait pas ce que je suis en train de faire, explique-t-il. Certaines de mes décisions d'intérêt public ont fait du bruit, mais ce sont plutôt celles d'un novice en politique. »

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: How to help Africa? Do business there

2007-10-06T02:32:00.000Z

Negative images of Africa dominate the news: famine and disease, conflict and corruption. But Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Finance Minister of Nigeria, says there's a less-told story unfolding in many African nations: one of reform, economic growth and business opportunity. Cracking down on corruption -- and the perception of corruption -- will be the key to its success. She tells how high-ranking Nigerian officials taking money illicitly have been jailed, and how citizens and prospective business partners are getting at least a partial picture now of where money flows.

Speakers Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Economic reformer

As the first female Finance Minister in Nigeria, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala attacked corruption to make the country more desirable for foreign investment and job creation.

Why you should listen to her:

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, was Nigeria's Finance Minister and then briefly Foreign Affairs Minister from 2003 to 2006, the first woman to hold either position.

"Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a heroine not just of Nigeria, but of the entire continent. Her crusade against corruption has put her life at risk." The Independent (UK)

China in Africa , friend or foe for the European Union? Why Africa Matters ?

2007-10-06T01:13:00.000Z

Sff ouçam um interessante diálogo entre o nosso estimado Prof. João Gomes Cravinho, SENEC de Portugal e o Director do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da RP da China, Xing Hua. Para visualizar o video , sff , clique sobre o link abaixo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPtf-WSeg24

Xing Hua , China

África uma das prioridades da presidência da União Europeia?

"Porque é África importante" foi o tema de abertura da conferência sobre este continente realizada esta semana em Bruxelas. Portugal elegeu África como uma das prioridades da presidência da União Europeia. Mas não é o único.

A China é o segundo parceiro comercial de África, logo atrás da Europa. Nospróximos dois anos, Pequim pretende conceder cinco mil milhões de euros em créditos. Mas os avultados investimentos da China geram polémica, em especial em países como o Sudão e Angola.

Xing Hua é o Sub-Director do instituto chinês de Relações Internacionais. E João Gomes Cravinho é o especialista em Segurança e Desenvolvimento e também Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação de Portugal.

Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação

Professor Doutor João Gomes Cravinho

João Gomes Cravinho, 40 anos. Licenciatura e mestrado pela London School of Economics e doutoramento pela Universidade de Oxford. Professor Auxiliar da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. Docente na licenciatura em Relações Internacionais dessa Faculdade e Coordenador do Programa de Doutoramento em Política Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos. Docente convidado no ISCTE e na Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

A sua tese de doutoramento versou sobre Moçambique, tendo publicado numerosos estudos académicos em revistas portuguesas e estrangeiras – Reino Unido, França, Espanha. A sua mais importante publicação em Relações Internacionais, para além de diversos artigos em revistas da especialidade, é o livro Visões do Mundo, publicado em 2002 e escrito principalmente enquanto Investigador Visitante na Universidade de Georgetown, em Washington.

Para além da sua carreira académica, João Gomes Cravinho tem dedicado muitos anos de actividade à cooperação para o desenvolvimento. Foi, designadamente, consultor de entidades nacionais (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian) e internacionais (Comissão Europeia, Banco Mundial), coordenador do relatório interministerial do Governo português sobre assistência a Timor Leste em 1999, trabalhou na Presidência portuguesa da União Europeia de 2000 no âmbito da cooperação, e entre Janeiro de 2001 e Junho de 2002 foi Presidente do Instituto da Cooperação Portuguesa.

Xing Hua

Remarks:	Mr. Xing enjoys the government's "distinguished contributor" specialist allowance.
Curricula vitae of the expert:
After graduating from the French Department of Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, Mr. Xing joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as interpreter, second and first secretary and political counsellor in the Department of Translation and Interpretation, and Chinese embassies in Guinea, Mauritania, Switzerland and Mali. In 1973, he joined CIIS where he took position of Deputy Director and Director of Division of European Studies and Vice President. He was a visiting scholar in the United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research (Geneva) in 1986 and Denmark Institute of international Studies in 1998. His research areas cover European situation analysis,NATO and European security, EU integration process, China-EU relations. http://www.ciis.org.cn/en/aboutus41.asp?id=50

( Vale a pena recuarmos até ao ano 2000 e lermos atentamente a entrevista do Sr. XING , abaixo, a fim de compreendermos melhor como se desenvolvem sistematicamente os três pilares da cooperação externa Chinesa)

INTERVIEW WITH XING HUA

Published in Autum 200o

Research Fellow & Vice-President - China Institute of International Affairs (CIIS)

ASEM: A STEP BY STEP PROCESS

Laurent Malvezin (LM).- During the Asian Financial Crisis, there has been a lot of arguments among Europeans about the capability of Asia to recover fully from the melt-down of their economies. Today, even if the recovery has been spectacular, doubts remain as to its sustainability, and the interests of the Europeans in the area seem on the wane. Some say that the EU pay less and less attention to the opinion of Asian countries. As an expert on China and European relations, do you agree with such a view?

Xing Hua (XH).- We have first to keep in mind that during the 2nd summit of ASEM, which was held in London in 1998 precisely during the crisis, European countries proved to be helpful and concerned. Not only that, they, in effect, turned their concern into concrete action, setting up the Asia-Europe Trust Fund (1), providing technical assistance to Asian countries' effort in terms of reform of other financial systems

Such an attitude was very much appreciated. Of course, Asian countries realised that the world economy being more and more integrated, the Asian crisis was bound to have some impact on the European economies as well, and therefore the European Union could not ignore it.

Nevertheless, European countries took a friendly posture towards the Asian countries in difficulty. This positive response somehow deepened and boosted the relationship between Asia and Europe. The Asian countries draw two lessons from the crisis: first, the necessity to improve their own industrial restructuring and to reorganise their financial system, second, the necessity to reform the international financial and monetary system. European countries can bring expertise and technical assistance, including to China, to reform our economies and financial systems. Actually, some actions have already been taken in that direction. As regards the international monetary system, the European countries and the Asian countries can cooperate together and make some proposition.

But having said that, we have to take stock of the fact that some European scholars and even politicians do not necessarily share the same analysis on Asian Financial crisis with their Asian counterparts. In Europe and Asia, there is such a proverb: “ build friendship through hard times “. During painful periods of economic crisis or difficulties, the European countries should look carefully at the objective causes of such a crisis in order to take positive actions. If this is done thoroughly, it will enhance a mutual understanding of what happened. It would obviously enhance the relationship between Europe and Asia on trust basis.

LM.- You mentioned the second ASEM summit as a key event in the middle of the crisis. What is the place and importance of the ASEM process in China Foreign policies ? Is it in harmony with the concept of “multi-polarization” that is at the core of the Chinese Foreign policies ?

XH.- First, I would like to emphasise that the involvement of China in ASEM is not accidental nor is it motivated by tactical considerations but the logical consequence of China approach to the new international order.

China is the largest developing country in the world. In the past 50 years, old China has been rejuvenated, achieving unprecedented developments since it implemented the open-door policy, especially in the last two decades. Its global national strength and its international standing have been notably enhanced and raised. The objectives of its fundamental policy are the economic construction of the country and the improvement of people's livelihood. It means, to achieve such a goal, on the foreign front, to carry out an independent foreign policy of peace, and to strive to create a sustained peaceful international environment. For that, we need to promote friendship and cooperation between the peoples of various countries in the world. Thus China is playing an ever-increasing positive role in the international cooperation.

For China, to participate in international cooperation means to take part actively in the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and other International Organisations, but also to get involved in regional cooperational institutions. Why then does China take seriously the Asia-Europe relationship? Because, amongst the world’s three largest economies, namely the US, Europe and Asia, which actually means East-Asia, there was already cooperation between US-Europe and US-Asia on a bilateral basis taking place for many years through effective mechanism. And so the third pillar, Europe-Asia would be reinforced and institutionalised)

Europe in the 1990’s went from being an European community to a European Union,. It has increased its economic standing in the world while the same evolution also occurred in Asia at the same time with the remarkable development of the East-Asian economies (2). Such trends have created a kind of mutual attractiveness between them and led to a common desire of deeper cooperation and relations. Moreover, the Asia-Europe rapprochement may bring additional voices in the arena of international affairs and a more impartial, balanced and stable way to manage the future of a globalized world rather than to rely on one superpower. So the whole process is in line with the concept of multi-polarization.

LM.- You mentioned three economic zones, the US one, the European one and the Asian one. Do you foresee a fourth pillar such as the South American one, which stands to be different from the US one, if only because it is a Latin speaking bloc rather than an Americanised one?

XH.- Indeed, and Latin America and Asia are preparing now to reach a common understanding about institutionalised economic cooperation. Later this year, one scholar of my Institute will attend an International conference on Asia-South America relations in Chile. China is deeply interested and will participate actively in the process.

LM.-While everyone focuses its attention on China-Us relations, has ASEM a special meaning for China?

XH.- We consider that the ASEM process aims at promoting the concept of multi-polarization, but does not constitute any kind of intention to isolate the US. As you are no doubt aware, in addition to the ASEM process, China, and the United States too, are also a member of APEC. Next year, the informal head of states summit of APEC (3) will actually take place in Shanghai.

LM.- Just looking at East-Asia, along with APEC, there are other groupings such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEM, ARF, some with what is known as their track II related organisations (4). How can all these institutions can work together or simultaneously in the fields of economic cooperation or even political dialogue?

XH.- From now, those who take part in ASEM are the members of ASEAN+3 (5). If East Asia represents Asia nowadays in the ASEM process, it is first because ASEAN has reached an unprecedented level of integration as a regional institution. Furthermore, the initiative of ASEM came from one of the ASEAN members: Singapore. Besides ASEAN members, three other countries of East Asia, China, Korea and Japan have, each of them, a close relationship with ASEAN members.

LM.- But East Asia is not Asia, and so the Asia-Europe summit is not really true to its name. Would China welcome an enlargement of the ASEM to new members of the South Asia Subcontinent, for example, India ?

XH.- Absolutely, China is ready to discuss with the members of both sides of ASEM about the possibility for new members to join the dialogue. If I’m not mistaken, India and Pakistan have already expressed their strong interest in ASEM. China is even not opposed to the entry of countries like Australia, and New Zealand as full members of ASEM, but other countries seem not ready to accept it so far.

LM.- We know that in the foreseeable future, the EU members will increase, and maybe reach 25 or even more. Can an ASEM with 30 members on the one side and 10 members on the other still work in a balanced way?

XH.- We have to negotiate together whether it is possible to reach a consensus on it. Of course, we have to bear in mind that, even now, there are 15 European members, for 10 Asian members, and somehow, a kind of balanced must be maintained in the future.

LM.- A question that a lot of people have often in mind when they talk about EU and Asia relationship, is the vision of an European integration model for Asia. Do you think that Asian Countries in their own Institution-building process can use the so-called European experience as a benchmark ?

XH.- All Asian countries agree that the EU experiment is a unique experience. As a major regional bloc, It has the highest level of integration, the strongest economic power, and has won the respect of Asian countries. But, here we have maybe to distinguish two different aspects of the question. The first aspect deals with each side sharing views from their own experience - the Integration process for the EU, and the regional economic cooperation for Asia. And the second aspect or vision consists in asking if the European model is applicable for Asian countries in their economic cooperation and integration process. I think that the former is possible and feasible, but the latter rather unrealistic. Actually, Europe and Asia have a different history and their present situation each have their own specifics. Perhaps the most relevant point is that the two regions, Asia and Europe, through the EU and ASEAN, are not at the same stage of development, and therefore, for instance, ASEAN integration is built on bilateral and multilateral state-to-state cooperation, rather than purely integration. Moreover, the so-called “European model” is not conceptually or practically as clear as it appears at first glance. Amongst EU members, there are many different views that do not necessarily reflect a unique model or projection of this model. Some countries want to promote the idea of a federal system, while others stand for enhancing cooperation between the sovereign states. In that extent, what is the reality of the “European model” ?

And secondly, I would have to say that in order to effectively get mutual confidence in cooperation, for both sides, maybe European countries should refrain from acting as a teacher vis-à-vis their Asian partners. The climate would be healthier and the cooperation become more efficient and sustainable if they would discard such a naive attitude.

LM.- Do you have the feeling that sometimes European countries behave like some sort of a paternalistic superpower?

XH.- I would rather express this idea in a more simple way. Yes, it is true, sometimes, among some European scholars as well as politicians, there is the syndrome of the medicine man, which consists in decreeing why and where Asia is suffering from and how to deal with it. Perhaps, before delivering the prescription, European people should be better informed of the realities of Asian countries, their idiosyncrasies and constraints.

LM.- Let us come back to ASEM process. There are three “pillars”, as fundamental areas of cooperation and dialogue: the economic and financial pillars, the political pillar and the intellectual and cultural pillar. In these three domains, what can be done and should be done to give ASEM some new impetus?

XH.- First, let me say that China is an active member at every level of the dialogue, from state leader summits to the second track activities, and their associated working groups dealing with specific research fields. For example, a Sciences and Technologies Ministers meeting was held in China. Regarding the three pillars of the dialogue, the stand of China is very clear and highlights the importance of each of them. The economic cooperation must lead to create a better economic environment, a sustainable development and the basis for cooperation in other field of activities.

Here I would say two words about the political pillar or dialogue. It is a fact that in some areas, such as the notion of security, moral values, development policies, Europe and Asia do have different ways of thinking, or even disagree on such notions. China on this crucial question advocate a step-by-step approach based on mutual respect. China’s understanding of the political dialogue broadly covers many area of research and cooperation: illegal migrations, drugs enforcement, international organised crime etc..

Notes:

1.- Responding to the economic and financial crisis in Asia, the London Summit in 1998 held a discussion on the crisis and its implication for Asia-Europe relations. Heads of government pledged to keep markets open in the face of any protectionist pressures which might arise from the crisis (the ASEM Trade and Investment Pledge), and agreed to launch an ASEM Trust Fund to provide technical expertise to address the financial and social issues arising from the crisis. They also agreed to establish a European Financial Expertise Network (EFEX) to identify high-level expertise in both the public and private sectors to provide assistance to Asia.

2.- Asian ASEM partners represent 31.5% of the world population, produce 18,9% of world GDP, account for 24% of world wide exports of goods (15.9% of services) and for 17.5% of world imports of goods (22.5% of services). They generate 7.5% of FDI outflows while absorbing 14.5% of FDI inflows (Data 1998).

3.- see Asian Affairs on Asean, avaiable on the website.

4. See organization chart in this issue.

5. In 1996, when ASEM was established, as it was an ASEAN-Europe initiative, the membership seemed a straight forward one. It was bound to be the ASEAN members plus China, Japan and Korea on one side (as the Asia part on it) and the European countries which were EU members. However, ASEAN expended faster than EU did. Since ASEM II, ASEAN has become a ten countries organization among which Myanmar which is unacceptable to some EU countries as a member of the Asian community (see S. Jayakumar about ASEM).

Published in Autum 2000

"Why Africa Matters" was the opening theme of a two-day conference held in Brussels this week. Portugal has made Africa a key priority during its EU presidency. But it's not the only one. China is Africa's second biggest trading partner after the EU. In this edition of Agora, two experts offer their views on why China will play an increasingly important role in shaping the continent's future.

Forget aid and money, Africa needs IDEAS ! By Philip Emeagwali

2007-10-06T00:52:00.000Z

Ideas, Not Money, Alleviate Poverty By Philip Emeagwali

If ideas are capital, why is Africa investing more on things than on information, and more on the military than on education? Suddenly, I realized what this idea could mean for Africa. If the pen is mightier than the sword, why does a general earn more than the work of a hundred writers combined? If ideas are indeed capital, then Africa should stem its brain drain and promote the African Renaissance, which will lead to the rebirth of the continent. After all, a renaissance is a rebirth of ideas. And knowledge and ideas are the engines that drive economic growth.

By Philip Emeagwali (Speech delivered at the University of Alberta, Canada, September 23, 2006)

I once believed that capital was another word for money, the accumulated wealth of a country or its people. Surely, I thought,

wealth is determined by the money or property in one’s possession. Then I saw a Deutsche Bank advertisement in the Wall Street Journal that proclaimed: “Ideas are capital. The rest is just money.” I was struck by the simplicity of such an eloquent and forceful idea. I started imagining what such power meant for Africa. The potential for progress and poverty alleviation in Africa relies on capital generated from the power within our minds, not from our ability to pick minerals from the ground or seek debt relief and foreign assistance.

When African men and women of ideas, who will give birth to new ideas, have fled to Europe and the United States, then the so-called African Renaissance cannot occur in Africa. It can only occur in Paris, London and New York. There are more Soukous musicians in Paris, than in Kinshasha; more African professional soccer players in Europe, than in Africa. African literature is more at home abroad than it is in Africa. In other words, Africans in Europe are alleviating poverty in Europe, not in Africa. Until the men and women of ideas - the true healers of Africa - start returning home, the African Renaissance and poverty alleviation will remain empty slogans. After all, the brightest ideas are generated and harnessed by men of ideas.

The first annual report by J.P. Morgan Chase, a firm with assets of 1.3 trillion dollars, reads: “The power of intellectual capital is the ability to breed ideas that ignite value.” This quote is a clarion call to African leaders to shift purposefully and deliberately from a focus on things to a focus on information; from exporting natural resources to exporting knowledge and ideas; and from being a consumer of technology to becoming a producer of technology.

For Africa, poverty will be reduced when intellectual capital is increased and leveraged to export knowledge and ideas. Africa’s primary strategy for poverty alleviation is to gain debt relief, foreign assistance, and investments from western nations. Poverty alleviation means looking beyond 100 percent literacy and aiming for 100 percent numeracy, the prerequisite for increasing our technological intellectual capital. Yet, in this age of information and globalization when poverty alleviation should result in producing valuable products for the global market and competing with Asia, the United States, and Europe - shamefully, diamonds found in Africa are polished in Europe and re-sold to Africans.

The intellectual capital needed to produce products and services will lead to the path of poverty alleviation. Intellectual capital, defined as the collective knowledge of the people, increases productivity. The latter - by driving economic growth - alleviates poverty, always and everywhere, even in Africa. Productivity is the engine that drives global economic growth.

Those who create new knowledge are producing wealth, while those who consume it are producing poverty. If you attend a Wole Soyinka’s production of Chinua Achebe’s “Things Fall Apart,” you consume the knowledge produced by Soyinka and Achebe as well as the actor’s production, much like I consume the knowledge and production of Bob Marley’s through his songs.

We will need wisdom, that which turns too much information - or information overload - into focused power, not only to process, but also to evaluate the overwhelming amount of information available on the Internet. This wisdom will give us the competitive edge and enable us to find creative solutions.

The following story illustrates the difference between information and wisdom. Twelve hundred years ago, in the city of Baghdad, lived a genius named Al-Khwarizmi, who was one of the fathers of algebra. In fact, the word algebra comes from the title of his book Al-jabr, which for centuries was the standard mathematics textbook. Al- Khwarizmi taught in an institution of learning called the House of Wisdom, which was the center of new ideas during Islam’s golden age of science. To this day we computer scientists honor Al-Khwarizmi when we use the word algorithm, which is our attempt to pronounce his name.

One day, Al-Khwarizmi was riding a camel laden down with algebraic manuscripts to the holy city of Mecca. He saw three young men crying at an oasis.

“My children, why are you crying?” he enquired. “Our father, upon his death, instructed us to divide his 17 camels as follows:

‘To my oldest son I leave half of my camels, my second son shall have one-third of my camels, and my youngest son is to have one- ninth of my camels.’”

“What, then, is your problem?” Al-Khwarizmi asked. “We have been to school and learned that 17 is a prime number that is, divisible only by one and itself and cannot be divided by two or three or nine. Since we love our camels, we cannot divide them exactly,” they answered.

Al-Khwarizmi thought for a while and asked, “Will it help if I offer my camel and make the total 18?”

“No, no, no,” they cried.

“You are on your way to Mecca, and you need your camel.” “Go ahead, have my camel, and divide the 18 camels amongst yourselves,” he said, smiling.

So the eldest took one-half of 18 - or nine camels. The second took one-third of 18 - or six camels. The youngest took one-ninth of 18 - or two camels. After the division, one camel was left: Al- Khwarizmi’s camel, as the total number of camels divided among the sons (nine plus six plus two) equaled 17.

Then Al-Khwarizmi asked, “Now, can I have my camel back?”

These young men had information about prime numbers, but they lacked the wisdom to use the information effectively. It is the manipulation of information to accomplish seemingly impossible purposes that defines true wisdom.

Today, we have ten billion pages of information posted on the Internet - more than enough to keep us busy the rest of our lives, and new information is being added daily. More information has been created in the last 100 years than in all of the previous 100,000 years combined. We need the wisdom to sift through and convert these billions of pages into information riches.

The genius of Al-Khwarizmi was not in his mathematical wizardry or even his book knowledge: It was in his experiential knowledge - his big-picture, right-brain thinking; creativity; innovation; and wisdom. It was his wisdom to add a camel to make the total 18 and still get his camel back.

Prime numbers are to whole numbers what the laws of physics are to physics. Twenty years ago, I used an Al-Khwarizmi approach to solve a notoriously difficult problem in physics. I added inertial force, which enabled me to reformulate Newton’s Second Law of Motion first as 18 equations and algorithms, and then as 24 million algebraic equations. Finally, I programmed 65,000 “electronic brains” called processors to work as one to solve those 24 million equations at a speed of 3.1 billion calculations per second.

Like Al-Khwarizmi, I derived my 18 equations through out-of-the-box thinking in an in-the-box world, adding my metaphorical camel: inertial force. In other words, I applied wisdom to known knowledge to generate intellectual capital.

Unless Africa significantly increases its intellectual capital, the continent will remain irrelevant in the 21st century and even beyond. Africa needs innovators, producers of knowledge, and wise men and women who can discover, propose, and then implement progressive ideas. Africa’s fate lies in the hands of Africans and the solution to poverty must come from its people. The future that lies ahead of Africa is for Africa to create, after the people have outlined their vision. We owe it to our children to build a firm foundation to enable them go places we only dreamt. For Africa to take center stage in today’s economic world, we have to go out and compete on a global basis. There is simply no other way to succeed.

Philip Emeagwali was voted history’s greatest scientist of African descent - and the 35th greatest African of all time - in a survey for the September 2004 issue of the London-based New African magazine. He won the 1989 Gordon Bell Prize, the Nobel Prize of supercomputing. To view the video recordings of this speech, visit

http://emeagwali.com .

~ by myglobalhustle on August 7, 2007

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on aid versus trade

2007-10-05T23:15:00.001Z

Vale a pena ouvir a reflexão de Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala contida neste video. A Sra. Ngozi, foi nomeada ontem, dia 4 de Outubro de 2007, "Managing Director" do Banco Mundial. Ngozi, que já foi Vice-Presidente do Banco Mundial e mais recentemente Ministra das Finanças e tb Ministra dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Nigéria, integrando o " dream team " ao lado de Charles Soludo e outros, é um notável exemplo da nova geração que pensa e constroe a Africa Positiva. Bem Haja !

Le président Zoellick nomme Mme Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala à un poste de directeur général de la Banque mondiale

2007-10-05T22:20:00.000Z

Nota HV: Após a recente nomeação de Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesli , ex-minstra da Nigéria para o posto de Vice-Presidente do Banco Mundial, a convite do então Presidente Paul Wolfowitz, eis que Zoellick, o novo Presidente do Banco Mundial acaba de convidar Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala para o distinto e exigente cargo de Managing Director do Banco.

Em Junho de 2003 , no início do seu segundo mandato, o ex- Presidente Obasanjo chamou ao governo um conjunto de tecnocratas , apolíticos e jovens , logo apelidados pelo home da rua como " dream team", empenhado em fazer profundas reformas económicas , em combater a corrupção e em usar apropriadamente as receitas do petróleo para combater a pobreza.

No "dream team" contavam-se nomes como o do Prof. Charles Soludo, gouvernador do Banco Central ; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, ministra das Finanças ; Nuhu Ribadu, patrão da luta contra a corrupção ; Nasir el-Rufaï, ministro do Districto da capital federal, Abuja ; Oby Ezekwesili, conseilheira especial do presidente Obasanjo para o orçamento. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala passou desde então (2003), a ser conhecida pelo cognome de " Madame Solutions" e a Nigéria deve-lhe o facto das IFI terem começado a levar a sério o empenho do governo federal em levar a cabo as reformas e em utilisar eficazmente as suas receitas para combater a pobreza.

Diplomada por Harvard e titular de um PhD em economia do desenvolvimento pela Massachusetts Institute of Technologie (MIT), onde trabalhou entre 1976 e 1981, Ngozi ingressou no Banco Mundial como economista em 1982, donde saíu em 2003, para integrar o "dream team" de Obasanjo. Ao longo de vinte e um anos de carreira no Banco ela subiu degrau a degrau até ao topo da instituição, tendo sido numero três do Banco , enquanto Vice-Presidente e Secretária- Geral. Ei-la de regresso a casa pela porta grande. Bem- Haja !

Washington le 4 octobre 2007 – Le président de la Banque mondiale a annoncé aujourd’hui la nomination de Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala à un poste de directeur général de l’institution. Mme Okonjo-Iweala rejoint les directeurs généraux, Juan Jose Daboub et Graeme Wheeler, les vice-présidents exécutifs, Lars Thunell (IFC) et Yukiko Omura (MIGA), et le directeur financier, Vincenzo La Via, à la haute direction du Groupe de la Banque mondiale.

En annonçant cette nomination, Robert Zoellick a déclaré : « Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala apporte une expérience et des compétences hors pair au Groupe de la Banque mondiale. Remarquable ministre des Finances, puis des Affaires étrangères du Nigéria, elle a aidé à piloter le programme de réformes du pays sur des questions telles que la prudence budgétaire, la transparence des comptes publics, la bonne gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption.

Elle a été le moteur de l’allégement de la dette du Nigéria, aidant son pays à obtenir du Club de Paris une annulation de dette de 18 milliards de dollars, un chiffre record. C’est en grande partie grâce à elle que son pays a obtenu sa toute première notation de crédit-souverain (BB moins), attribuée par Fitch and Standard & Poor’s. C’est une dirigeante politique mondialement respectée.
En outre, elle connaît bien la Banque mondiale où elle a travaillé pendant 21 ans. Son attachement à la cause des pays en développement est sans pareil. Je suis ravi de la voir rejoindre mon équipe de direction. »

Ressortissante nigériane, Mme Okonjo-Iweala, est fondatrice de NOI-Gallup, un institut de sondage d’opinion nigérian, et cofondatrice du Makeda Fund, un fonds d’investissement dans des entreprises dirigées par des Africaines. Elle est membre (Distinguished Fellow) de la Brookings Institution. De 2003 à 2006 elle a été ministre des Finances, puis ministre des Affaires étrangères. En tant que ministre des Finances, Mme Okonjo-Iweala dirigeait l’équipe économique nationale chargée de mettre en œuvre le vaste programme de réformes économiques et sociales de l’administration Obasanjo. Les réformes ont notamment permis de progresser sur la voie du rétablissement de la stabilité macroéconomique, multipliant par trois le taux de croissance, lançant un combat résolu contre la corruption et améliorant la transparence.

Avant de prendre son portefeuille ministériel, Mme Okonjo-Iweala a occupé plusieurs postes importants à la Banque mondiale, dont ceux de vice-président et secrétaire, de directeur des opérations pour la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord, et de directeur des opérations pour l’unité sous-régionale Asie du Sud-Est et Mongolie. Elle est entrée à la Banque mondiale en 1982.

En acceptant ce nouveau poste, Mme Okonjo-Iweala a déclaré : « Je suis ravie de revenir et heureuse de la possibilité qui m’est donnée de travailler avec cette grande institution pour changer la vie de nos jeunes, et de nos travailleurs et travailleuses dans les pays en développement. Je me réjouis tout particulièrement à la perspective de travailler avec le président Zoellick au moment où il trace de nouvelles perspectives très prometteuses pour le Groupe de la Banque mondiale.»

Mme Okonjo-Iweala a reçu de nombreux prix et distinctions : European Hero de 2004 du Time Magazine, Ministre mondial des Finances pour l’année 2005 de l’Euromoney Magazine, Ministre africain des Finances pour l’année 2005 du Financial Times/The Banker, Ministre nigérian pour les années 2004 et 2005 de This Day, Docteur honoris causa de droit du Colby College en 2007, et de la Brown University en 2006, Docteur honoris causa de lettres et sciences humaines de la Northern Caribbean University, en Jamaïque.

Elle est membre ou présidente de nombreux conseils et groupes consultatifs du secteur public, privé et non gouvernemental, à savoir : DATA, World Resources Institute, Clinton Global Initiative, Nelson Mandela Institution/African Institutes of Science and Technology, Mo Ibrahim Foundation Governance Prize Committee, Friends of the Global Fund Africa.

Elle conseille également la Banque mondiale sur l’Initiative pour la restitution des avoirs volés (STAR) et est membre du Comité Malan sur la collaboration entre la Banque et le FMI.

Mme Okonjo-Iweala est diplômée de Harvard en économie (A.B., magna cum laude) et titulaire d’un doctorat (PhD) en économie et développement régional du Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Dans ses nouvelles fonctions, Mme Okonjo-Iweala sera responsable des régions Afrique, Asie du Sud, et Europe et Asie centrale de la Banque mondiale. Elle supervisera également le département des Ressources humaines. Elle prend ses fonctions le 1^er décembre.

Darfur Genocide Documentary

2007-08-03T12:52:00.001Z

Darfur Genocide Documentary

2007-08-03T12:51:00.001Z

Rebuilding Hope: Pre-Trip thoughts from former

2007-08-03T12:50:00.001Z

American Teens, Rwandan Truths

2007-08-03T12:49:00.001Z

Darfur: Is Our Choice Too

2007-08-03T12:24:00.001Z

Africa you never see on TV

2007-08-03T12:03:00.001Z

Mama Africa by Akon

2007-08-03T11:56:00.001Z

Mama Africa Akon's Song

2007-08-03T11:54:00.001Z

Mama Africa by Akon

2007-08-03T11:40:00.001Z

Africa you never see on tv

2007-08-03T11:25:00.001Z

Esta é a Africa Positiva .

Y ABÓ

2007-08-02T21:17:00.001Z

O Patche de Rima cresce a cada dia que passa. Ele lançou as sementes da nova geração . BRAVO PATCHE !

Patche di Rima , Guineendady

2007-08-02T20:55:00.001Z

Guiné Bissau e o Malamjae 2

2007-08-02T20:49:00.001Z

Há duas Guinés-Bissaus, esta que devia ser de toda a gente , mas é só de alguns e aquela da pobreza que circunda a " Casa Emanuel" , que não devia ser a Guiné de ninguém , porque ninguém merece tanto sofrimento.

Casa Emanuel - Guinea Bissau

2007-08-02T20:26:00.001Z

Disgraciadu ki misti dananu terra ...Ba nhu...

This is Guinea-Bissau

2007-08-02T20:24:00.001Z

Sem comentários .

Hélder Vaz - Um Filho da Guiné-Bissau

Oportunidades de Emprego no Banco Mundial ( Deadline: Nov.- Dez 2007)

Professional and Technical Staff Opportunities - Current Vacancies ( Nov.Dec. 2007)

Banco Mundial: Programa de Jovens Quadros para Afro-descendentes 2008

Junior Professionals Program for Afro-Descendants

What are we looking for?

Are you eligible?

What are we offering?

How to apply?

Rede Mundial de Formação para o Desenvolvimento

À atenção dos jovens quadros da área do desenvolvimento : Programa de Bolsas do Banco Mundial

Institut de la Banque Mondiale (WBI)

Qu'est-ce que les programmes de bourses?

Ampliar e Manter o Crescimento em África

Répandre et Pérenniser la Croissance en Afrique

Boas Notícias : (Africa Achieving Healthy)

JOVEM CLANDESTINO GUINEENSE , DE 15 ANOS, ATIRADO AO MAR JUNTO Á COSTA BRASILEIRA

TACV Vai Ligar Bissau a Lisboa

This is Guinea-Bissau (?)

Nene Tuty Bssafinté Mantchuta- Aleluia

Chachá di Charmi - Aló Guiné - Dur Di Nha Dur

n`punta bu nome

Camilo Domingos: dolce vita

Camilo Domingos: nha vida chora

Ballet Nafaya, de Matam , Guinée -Conakry

Guiné-Bissau - Americo Gomes: About you

Américo Gomes

Insólito

Hommage a la Guinée

LA GUINEE: CHANGEMENT !

Lettre ouverte / Insoumis Sigui

massacre du 22 janvier 2007 en Guinée

Massacre en Guinée Conakry 2007 - (1er Partie)

Guinée - Conakry 2006/2007

Sekouba Bambino, Desert Festival, Essakane, Tombouctou 2006

SEKOUBA BAMBINO DIABATÉ a Montreal

Sekouba Bambino - Jolie Den

Arrivée de Sekouba Bambino a Berlin

Sekouba Bambino a Kankan Mamaya -2007

SEKOUBA BAMBINO DIABATÉ: LIVE CONCERT A KANKAN

GUINEE : JAMAIS OUBLIER JANVIER 2007

Yaya Bangoura

Maimouna Barry

Djekoria Fanta

Sona Tata

Sona_Tata

Histoire de La Guinée (1er Partie)

Histoire de La Guinée ( 2e partie)

Guinée - Calu Bana : Fernandinha

Guine - Bissau, Amerigo Gomes: Madon(Mbalakh Ndiago)

Guiné-Bissau : Amerigo Gomes: Inha nomi

Guine -Bissau, Amerigo Gomes: Madon(Mbalakh Ndiago)

Guiné - Bissau: Amerigo Gomes: Arcel

Guinée - Amerigo Gomes: Tempo nobo

N`punta bu nome

Guineendady

Guiné Bissau e o Malamjae 2

Guiné-Bissau, Bissau Capital di Sabura KU Cansera

Guiné Bissau, saudades e mais saudades

Guiné Bissau paisagens di terra bonito

A PROPÓSITO DOS VOSSOS COMENTÁRIOS QUE NÃO CHEGAM AO BLOG:

ZHONGXIANG ZHANG : China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective

IFC: Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference

Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Let's have a deeper discussion on aid

About this Talk

Speakers Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Economic reformer

Why you should listen to her:

Menos corrupção colocaria Portugal ao nível da Finlândia

Menos corrupção colocaria Portugal ao nível da Finlândia

MAIS:

Sociedade :TATIANA de Luanda, Finalista do 2º Big Brother Africa

October , 2007

Mining : Tokyo Sexwale Investing in Cameroon

Mvelaphanda Holdings to assess mining and energy in Cameroon

Thabo Mbeki and Tokyo Sexwale: Have the two men really settled their past differences?

Thabo Mbeki and Tokyo Sexwale

Daniel Kaufmann: 10 Myths About Governance and Corruption

Ashraf Ghani on rebuilding broken states

Talks Ashraf Ghani: How to fix broken states